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Abstract 
In this thesis I take a broadly consequentialist normative position and argue that because fair 
trade is an inefficient method of aiding the poor, we should not support it and prefer free trade 
goods with an appropriate and equal donation to a charity, designed to aid the poor and 
encourage development in the undeveloped and developing world, instead. I also argue that 
globalisation is the best means of development and we should support it as well. The thesis 
progresses first by considering consequentialism, which I argue is especially suited to the 
problem of analysing poverty in applied ethics, and some objections to it, which I briefly attempt 
to answer.  Following that, I consider fair trade and both some theoretical and practical problems 
that it faces which my alternative does not. Then I briefly consider how globalisation results in 
development and why it should be supported. Finally, I conclude with a brief chapter where I 
respond to a few pertinent objections which arise on the periphery of my discussion that could be 
seen as damaging to my position.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Declarations 
 
1. Candidate's declarations 
I, Daniel Wood, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 40,000 words in length, has been written by me, 
that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher 
degree. 
I was admitted as a research student in September, 2009 and as a candidate for the degree of MPhil in Philosophy in 
September, 2009; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 
2009 and 2010. 
Date   Signature of candidate  
2. Supervisor's declarations 
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the 
degree of MPhil in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application 
for that degree. 
Date   Signature of supervisor  
3. Permission for electronic publication 
In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I understand that I am giving permission for it to be made 
available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any 
copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and the abstract will be 
published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my 
thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by award of an embargo as requested 
below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued 
access to the thesis. I have obtained any third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such 
access and migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo below.  
The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the electronic publication of this thesis:  
Access to printed copy and electronic publication of thesis through the University of St Andrews. 
 
 
Date  Signature of candidate     Signature of supervisor 
 
  
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to gratefully acknowledge the help that I received in writing this thesis from Tim 
Mulgan. I could not have asked for a more easy going yet helpful supervisor who allowed me the 
independence to pursue my own ideas, but was always promptly ready to read my drafts and 
provide me with invaluable suggestions. I would also like to thank my midterm reviewers Berys 
Gaut and Craig Smith for their comments on the first chapter of this thesis, and to thank the 
entire faculty at the philosophy department of St Andrews for the privilege of studying in such a 
fantastic setting. Finally, I would like to thank my family and girlfriend Diana for the support 
and love they gave me throughout the year I spent writing this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my friend and mentor Murray Shoolbraid. The little success 
and great pleasure I have taken from academics I owe more to him than any other person. 
 
 
 
 
  
Contents 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2 
Chapter One ........................................................................................................................ 5 
1.1 Consequentialism and the Principles of Beneficence and Utility Maximisation ...... 5 
1.2 Objections to Consequentialism ................................................................................ 9 
The Injustice Objection ............................................................................................... 9 
Alienation Objection.................................................................................................. 15 
The Demandingness Objection .................................................................................. 21 
Combined Consequentialism ..................................................................................... 25 
1.3 Defining Utility and Rationality, Globalisation, and Poverty and Development.... 26 
Utility and Rationality ............................................................................................... 26 
Globalisation .............................................................................................................. 32 
Poverty and Development ......................................................................................... 33 
1.4 Benefits of Adopting Consequentialism ................................................................. 35 
1.5 Economics and Philosophy ..................................................................................... 44 
Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................................... 49 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 49 
2.1 Subsidising Industries ............................................................................................. 53 
2.2 Specific Theoretical Costs of Fair Trade................................................................. 62 
2.3 An Alternative to Fair Trade ................................................................................... 66 
  
2.4 Economies of Scale ................................................................................................. 68 
2.5 Bumper Crops ......................................................................................................... 71 
2.6 Sustainability ........................................................................................................... 72 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 76 
Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................................... 77 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 77 
3.1 Plan B and A+ ......................................................................................................... 78 
3.2 Growth and Inequality ............................................................................................. 84 
3.3 Economies of Scale, Industrialisation, and Free Market Economies ...................... 93 
3.4 Free Trade ............................................................................................................... 98 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 103 
Chapter 4 ......................................................................................................................... 104 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 104 
4.1 Paternalism, Cultural Imperialism vs Relativism, and Rationality ....................... 104 
4.2 Other Undue Appeals to Moderation .................................................................... 107 
4.3 Boycotting, Protectionism, and Human Rights ..................................................... 109 
4.4 The means of production, profits and Inequality. ................................................. 115 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 119 
References ....................................................................................................................... 121 
  
 The Ethics of Globalisation, Free Trade and Fair Trade  2 
Introduction 
One of the most important ethical questions that faces us today is what should we do 
about poverty? It is an exhaustive question that covers dozens of complicated and integrated 
facets in moral and economic theory. The goal of this project is to evaluate some of the 
approaches to solving this problem. Some of the questions that will be tackled include: Does 
globalisation exacerbate or alleviate poverty?  If globalisation actually reduces poverty, then 
should we support it, even if it means buying goods manufactured in sweatshops with 
substandard –often horrific– working conditions? Is fair trade preferable to free trade? And, 
probably most importantly, what should an ordinary person do to help solve world poverty in the 
most effective way possible? Essentially, this is a work of applied ethics. The central thesis is 
that globalisation is a force for good, and that free trade is ethically superior to fair trade. An 
important focus will be one that emphasises what the average person can do to help reduce 
poverty without making considerable demands on that person, though I certainly don‟t argue 
against the morality of charitable action. I will conclude with simple measures that the ordinary 
person can take that alleviate poverty more effectively than alternatives that are often adopted 
instead. 
The initial goal of this project is to justify its existence in the first place. Perhaps, the first 
objection to this thesis will not be to take issue with any of the premises or the arguments it 
employs, but rather to question its proper place within the discipline of philosophy in the first 
place. It might be argued that I am not writing an essay in applied ethics at all, but that instead 
one that would be more appropriate in an economics department. Thus, I will attempt to refute 
this first objection before moving into the philosophical questions that I wish to tackle.  
However, to do this it will first be necessary to explain and justify the approach to normative 
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ethics that I employ. The general normative theory that I accept is a consequentialist one. As my 
thesis is that globalisation is a force for good, and that while there may be consequences of the 
process of globalisation that prima facie appear to be bad, (the labour conditions in sweat shops 
for example) these are actually inevitable and steps towards solving the world‟s greatest problem 
–world poverty. It is necessary, given my approach, to employ economic theory and utilise 
economic facts to study this problem and come to an appropriate position on what it is that we, 
as citizens of developed nations, should do to solve the problem.  
First, I shall outline broadly the normative approach that I favour. While I shall argue that 
it is not essential to accept it for all of my arguments to work, I do admit that at times I will 
largely take it for granted. However, as this is a work of applied ethics, there will be many 
versions of alternative normative theories that will work just as well for my cause, but they will 
not necessarily guarantee all of my conclusions quite as neatly as consequentialism does. 
However, it will largely be up to the reader who doesn‟t accept my view of normative ethics to 
determine how plausible the conclusions are in light of the normative theory that she favours. 
   The first chapter will quickly explain my general consequentialist approach and will 
cover some of the most common, and generally accepted as most powerful, objections (as well as 
replies to these objections) to consequentialism. I will examine in more detail the demandingness 
objection, because it especially applies to the topic at hand, and I hope, humbly, to suggest that 
in some regards the positions that I will be advocating go a small way towards finding a middle 
ground that could serve as a solution to this objection, at least the problem in terms of applied 
ethics.  Further, I will explain some secondary benefits of accepting consequentialism, because 
of its close connection to economic theory, which is important to understanding properly what 
poverty actually is, its causes and its solutions.  This will largely take the form of giving some 
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key definitions and how they can be expressed in consequentialist terms. After that, I will present 
my position in two chapters. In the second chapter I will argue for why fair trade should be 
abandoned. In the third chapter I will focus on why globalisation should be supported. In the 
fourth and final chapter I will reply quickly to objections that opponents of my position might 
raise in response to the second and third chapter. 
Before I move on to distinguishing my project from economics, I will now explain the 
consequentialist position that I endorse. Then I will attempt to deal with the most common 
objections to consequentialism, especially the one that directly relates to my subject matter: the 
demandingness objection. 
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Chapter One 
1.1 Consequentialism and the Principles of Beneficence and Utility Maximisation 
I will use and accept a consequentialist approach to ethics as my broad normative theory. 
It is not necessary to elaborate too extensively on the theory that I accept, because the premises 
that I will employ, which are largely justified by my normative views,
1
 are common to, or can be 
adapted to fit, virtually all consequentialist theories (such as the most well known theory of 
consequentialism, utilitarianism). Consequentialism, as a broad term, refers to the view that 
acting morally consists in engaging in actions that create certain outcomes or consequences 
which are taken to be desirable.  
Consequentialism, as I use the term, comprises many different theories that distinguish 
themselves mostly by the differences in the nuanced details that attempt best to reflect their 
proponent‟s intuitions about what is moral and what is not, and which intuitions must be juggled 
and sacrificed in the interests of getting a satisfactory theory of ethics. However, they are united 
by a common approach to ethics: to be moral is to act so as to realise certain consequences, what 
                                                 
1
 There is of course a difficult question in moral philosophy: is it our intuitions about what is ethical that determines 
which theories that we should accept, or should we accept a theory and then attempt to shape our intuitions with it? 
The problem resembles the chicken and egg paradox. We cannot prefer one normative theory to another without 
some sort of criteria, which will inevitably have to be our pre-theoretical  intuitions about what is right and wrong, 
but then how do we accommodate the theory that we select, on those grounds, when that theory violates other 
intuitions that we, or at least many others, accept, which it will inevitably do? Further, one of the benefits of a 
normative theory is that it is supposed to help us make moral decisions when our intuitions are murky or 
inconsistent, so surely we cannot simply rely only on what our pre-theoretical intuitions tell us, or we need not have 
adopted the normative theory in the first place. The solution is a balancing act, which is unfortunately difficult to 
express completely. However, it is clear that there must be some room for our normative theories justifying 
normative claims, even if the claims are similar to the basic intuitions that we used to justify adopting that particular 
normative theory in the first place. Similarly, occasionally based on the theory that we have selected, it must be 
acceptable to override our pre-theoretical intuitions, especially when our intuitions are contradictory or obscure. For 
further discussion on this issue, see especially the principle of „reflective equilibrium‟ in John  Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) and the literature that surrounds it, such as Michael DePaul, 
“Reflective Equilibrium and Foundationalism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 23.1 (1986): 59-69; Gilbert 
Harman, “Three Trends in Moral and Political Philosophy,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 37.3 (2003): 415-25;Brad 
Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), and Warren Quinn, Morality and Action 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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exactly these consequences are depends on the particular theory being used. Thus according to a 
consequentialist, two similar acts (such as lying or stealing) can differ with one another as to 
their moral status, simply because of the consequences of those acts: for example, stealing food 
to feed starving children, or lying to save a friend from a murderer at the door, may be 
acceptable, but stealing jewellery from a store to felicitate an early retirement, or lying to 
persuade a potential client to invest in a Ponzi scheme may be immoral. It can also be true that 
acts can differ in their moral status even when the intention of the actors is the same. Thus, 
stealing food from an orphanage filled with malnourished children to feed one‟s family can be 
wrong, while stealing food, for the same reason, from a wealthy and well fed Hedge Fund 
manager may be ethical. To apply consequentialism directly to the question at hand yields a 
result like this: Whatever action will lead to the best consequences in developing and 
undeveloped regions, such as large parts of Africa (assuming that it doesn’t drastically reduce 
wellbeing elsewhere) is the action that we should take. As we shall see shortly, this claim may 
need to be tempered due to objections of demandingness. 
Actually, it is my hope that I will not need necessarily to rely on consequentialism at the 
expense of other normative theories at all, by which I mean that, many if not most, readers who 
do not identify themselves within the school of consequentialism will still find my arguments 
persuasive and accept my conclusions by adopting a weaker consequentialist view. For example, 
this could be expressed in terms of reasons. We might see acting morally (and indeed acting at 
all) as the balancing of many different competing reasons to take a host of possible actions; thus, 
one might always have a moral reason to promote total utility, provided that it is not overridden 
by a more pressing reason. For example, one might always have a more paramount reason never 
to kill an innocent person, but assuming one does not have such an overriding reason, then we 
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would be obligated to perform the utility maximising action (though this may be softened 
further, due to the demandingness objection, which we shall discuss shortly).
2
 This weaker 
principle simply states that one should maximise the good, provided that it doesn‟t violate 
whatever other theories of ethics one subscribes to, for example by forcing agents to do things 
like shooting an innocent man to stop a riot that would otherwise kill many more innocent 
people.
3
 The second normative premise that I must have is at least a limited principle of 
beneficence,
4
 while a limited principle of beneficence is guaranteed by standard consequentialist 
theories, it is also widely accepted by proponents of all ethical theories, including deontological 
theories and virtue ethics. Perhaps the only exceptions are, radical egoism, certain forms of 
contractarian (social contract) theory, for example as argued for by David Gauthier,
5
 and 
libertarianism. 
 However, whether a principle of beneficence can be justified, or is necessary, given an 
alternative ethical theory to consequentialism, is not a question that shall be further considered. If 
it can be done, then so much the better, but if it cannot be done, then so much the worse for those 
alternative theories, because the principle of beneficence is not one that should be up for debate, 
and any theory that cannot produce an equivalent principle is not worth considering. 
Thus, the two normative claims that are at the centre of my project are simple and, as I 
suggested above, largely uncontroversial. First, the weak consequentialist principle of utility 
maximisation, we should maximise the good, provided that it doesn’t violate other ethical 
                                                 
2
 See for example, Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press 1998), and John Skorupski, The Domain of Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming 2010). 
3
 Otsuka, for example, calls something, if not identical to this, at least very similar to this, the „Restricted Principle 
of Maximization.‟ See Michael Otsuka, “The Paradox of Group Beneficence,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 20.2 
(1991):139-49. 
4
 It is also limited by the demandingness objection. 
5
 David Gauthir, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986). 
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restrictions.
6
 Second, a limited principle of beneficence, we should take action to help others 
that are greatly in need, if we have it within our reasonable power to do so, even if we have no 
significant relations with those people and owe no other obligations to them.  There is another 
common moral intuition that I shall not be relying upon, because not only is it superfluous given 
my consequentialist position, but more because it does not apply to the situation nearly as well as 
those philosophers who rely on it suppose:
7
 we should refrain from any action that will lead to 
the harming of another person, unless we fairly compensate that person, or unless we are 
compelled to take that action for another superseding ethical reason.
8
 Many argue that as our 
economic prosperity comes directly at the expense of the developing and undeveloped world, we 
are obligated to aid them, because of this principle. However, the claim that „our economic 
prosperity comes directly at the expense of the developing and undeveloped world‟ is false, as 
shall be shown later. Therefore, we must either conclude that we owe no obligations to the poor, 
or we must find another way to generate those obligations, and I look no further than a 
consequentialist moral theory and most importantly a general principle of beneficence (the 
strength and demands of such a principle will shortly be discussed). 
                                                 
6
 Crucially, I also assume that it does not violate one‟s theory of ethics to buy goods from a person that is benefited 
overall by the exchange, even if the conditions that that person made those goods under are less than ideal. The 
significance of this will become more clear in the third chapter. 
7
 For example, Tomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Malden, 2002), uses this principle to justify our 
obligation to the people living in developing countries. However, this obligation, of course, consists of doing more 
to help them than we are now, but this requires assuming that globalisation is a force for evil rather than good, which 
I shall be arguing is false. If globalisation is a force for good, then our obligations to many developing countries 
would be greatly diminished, perhaps to the point where those obligations have already been met. If we want to 
maintain that we should do much to help the plight of ordinary people in developing and undeveloped countries, 
(such as people in the sub-Saharan region of Africa) as I do, then we need a Principle of Beneficence to justify this 
obligation. 
8
 A normative claim like this is what implicitly justifies virtually all ethically motivated boycotts, such as the refusal 
to buy sugar harvested by slaves in the 19
th
 century, or the decision that many of us make today to refuse to buy foie 
gras and other foods that rely on the technique of gavage. And it is also this intuition that many people today use, 
unfortunately, to justify boycotting many free trade goods and the companies that produce and sell them. 
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1.2 Objections to Consequentialism 
There are many objections to consequentialism, and due to space constraints most will 
have to be ignored. I will focus on only three objections, which I take to be generally considered 
as the strongest. The first objection is one of injustice. It is often alleged that consequentialism 
fails properly to account for basic tenets of justice. Secondly, I will look at the claim that 
consequentialism alienates those who follow it in such a way as to create a paradox that 
demonstrates its contradiction. Thirdly, I will consider an objection that is especially central to 
my own thesis: the demandingness objection. I will conclude the section with some thoughts on 
how an adequate theory of consequentialism may be formed by incorporating solutions to both 
the second and third objection using an account of combined consequentialism as argued for by 
Tim Mulgan. 
The Injustice Objection 
The first problem consequentialists generally run into is a question: how can one be 
required to take what is generally considered to be an immoral action in the name of morality? A 
standard formulation of this problem that gets to the heart of the issue is: would you shoot an 
innocent man to stop a riot that would otherwise kill many more innocent people? Obviously, the 
standard consequentialist answer is yes. There are many other examples like this that are 
pervasive throughout ethical disputes. The problem can be simply stated as follows: do the ends 
always justify the means, if there is a larger amount of utility created by those means than any 
other action? We are forced down one of two unpalatable paths, either we accept that the ends 
can justify the means, which often results in conclusions that go against our intuitions, or we 
accept that desirable ends do not justify certain means, and we are faced with other unethical 
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conclusions. Henceforth, I shall call this problem „the injustice dilemma.‟ Thus, the injustice 
objection to consequentialism is one of the horns of the injustice dilemma; specifically, it is the 
side of the dilemma where certain, intuitively bad,  means lead to a better end, yet we find 
ourselves against their use. 
In this debate, it is not surprising that opponents of consequentialism try to put as much 
emphasis as possible on horrific means, while consequentialists use examples with virtually 
trivial, yet technically unjust, means and extraordinarily desirable ends. The debate is made even 
more difficult because we often have conflicting intuitions depending on, what appear to many 
as, morally trivial differences. For example, the famous trolley car problem.
9
 
There has been, as one would expect, considerable debate on the injustice objection, and 
many possible solutions have been proposed. There are effectively two approaches that a 
consequentialist may take. The first is to build a very nuanced version of consequentialism, 
which, through a host of possible theoretical distinctions, attempts to create a theory that 
accommodates the difficult thought experiments, so that the conflicting intuitions that these 
thought experiments create are resolved satisfactorily. One such attempt is to introduce agent 
relativity.
10
 Or secondly, the approach that I favour is to bite the bullet and defend the strict 
consequentialist line for all of the examples of injustice objections, and instead argue that it is 
                                                 
9
 See for a discussion of this problem, Judith J. Thomson, “Killing, Letting Die and The Trolley Problem,” Monist 
59.2 (1976): 204-17; and for the original thought experiment, Philippa Foote, “The Problem of Abortion and the 
Doctrine of Double Effect,” Oxford Review, 5 (1967): 5-15. 
10
 For example, see John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Amartya Sen, “Rights 
and Agency,” Philosophy and Public Affairs  11.1 (1982): 3-39; Douglas W. Portmore, “Can an Act-
Consequentialist Theory be Agent-Relative?” American Philosophical Quarterly 38.4 (2001): 363-77, and Douglas 
W. Portmore, “Position-Relative Consequentialism. Agent-Centered Options, and Supererogation.” Ethics 113.2 
(2003): 303-32. 
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our intuitions that in certain cases should be overridden,
11
 because it is they that are contradictory 
and more appropriate for ordinary moral questions, rather than such farfetched ones.
12
  
While I accept that though these thought experiments may provide persuasive force, I 
suggest that the best approach is to step back and see if we can characterise the problem in 
different terms, without resorting to such prejudicial methods of argumentation. The dilemma is 
such that both consequentialists and anti-consequentialists can levy intuitively plausible 
objections against their opponents simply by modifying very slight details in their thought 
experiments. Thus, when engaging in such an approach, the ethical theory one inevitably settles 
upon is largely dependent upon the often contradictory pre-theoretical intuitions one has that are 
most strongly twigged by the thought experiment in question. However, this is clearly not the 
ideal way to answer this puzzle, which is why cutting away as many of the unnecessary factors is 
essential. 
Allow me to attempt to solve this problem with either one of two positions: first with an 
argument that concludes with a very weak claim, followed by an argument that has a much 
stronger claim as its conclusion. First, I shall argue, for my purposes this is not a problem that I 
have to solve, because I can utilise a very weak form of consequentialism that is effectively 
immune to these objections. Then I will argue (largely by paraphrasing Scheffler) that actually 
consequentialism is the correct position and that nonconsequentialist theories are contradictory. 
However, the second argument should be seen more as a candidate explanation for solving the 
injustice dilemma, not as necessarily a death blow to deontology. I wish simply to show that 
                                                 
11
 Recall our earlier discussion of reflective equilibrium. 
12
 Proponents of this approach include Alastair Norcross, “Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives,” 
Philosophy Public Affairs 26.2 (1997): 135-67; Peter Singer, “Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium,” Monist 58 
(1974): 490–517; Timothy Sprigge, “A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey,” Inquiry 8.1 (1965): 264-91; and Peter 
Unger Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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consequentialists at least have plausible reasons for preferring their position to deontology 
because of this dilemma, and certainly one of the primary reasons why I prefer consequentialism 
as a normative theory. I should emphasise again though that it is my first argument that I chiefly 
rely upon here. 
First of all, in the preceding section I specifically specified that the two central normative 
claims that my project hinges upon are a limited principle of beneficence, and a weak principle 
of maximisation. I am prepared to accept such weak forms of these principles that I can 
effectively circumnavigate this objection. All that we need to accept are the following claims: we 
should maximise the good, provided that it doesn’t violate other ethical restrictions, and 
secondly we should take action to help others that are greatly in need, if we have it within our 
reasonable power to do so, even if we have no significant relations with those people and owe no 
other obligations to them. This still leaves open questions about how to define utility and worries 
about demandingness, but we shall discuss these shortly. However, as I also stated earlier, I do 
favour some form of consequentialist theory, not only because it guarantees a suitably strong 
principle of beneficence, but because my intuitions when it comes to solving the injustice 
dilemma are consequentialist. I will now attempt to justify this approach with a second argument 
that concludes that we should favour consequentialism over its rivals because of this dilemma. 
There are many peripheral questions that appear to be intrinsically linked to the injustice 
objection; these lead to especially muddy, philosophical waters. However by correctly framing 
the debate, we can dispose of most of them: leaving us a more simple question. Here are a few 
examples of questions that should be set aside: „How do we weigh the consequences of different 
acts?’, ‘What happens if the only reason the bad consequences are necessary is because another 
agent insists on committing an immoral act?’, or ‘What happens if the choice comes down to 
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selecting a larger quantity of one kind of good over a smaller quantity of another, like choosing 
to violate one person’s democratic rights, to promote several peoples’ equality rights?’. Any 
thought experiment that attempts to answer one of these questions as well as the injustice 
objection simultaneously should be ignored, because questions like these obfuscate rather than 
clarify the problem. They can be effectively neutralised by focusing on the real issue at hand. 
Scheffler characterises the problem as whether „Agent-Centered Restrictions‟ can be justified.13 
Agent-centered restrictions require agents in certain situations to refrain from taking an action, 
because that action itself is somehow unethical, that would otherwise produce an overall better 
result. These are contrasted with agent centered prerogatives,
14
 which allow agents to refrain 
from taking the action that maximises total utility in certain circumstances (essentially when the 
total cost to utility is not drastic), if it is to their own benefit. Scheffler is in favour of the latter 
and not the former, but we shall get into this in more detail shortly, when we consider the 
demandingness objection. 
To get to the heart of the problem requires only asking one question: “Can it be rational 
to forbid the performance of a morally objectionable action that will have the effect of 
minimising the total number of comparably objectionable actions that are performed and will 
have no other morally relevant consequences?”15 We effectively side step questions about the 
coherence of aggregate utilities, comparing one good to another, or whether other rational agents 
being involved is relevant. We do this by focusing purely on the actions themselves, and we note 
that if an action is unethical, then surely it is preferable to have less, rather than more, of these 
actions. If in principle one can honestly prefer, as morally superior, a world with several identical 
                                                 
13
 Samuel Scheffler, “Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, And the Virtues,” Mind, 94:375 (1985): 409-19.  
14
 Samuel Scheffler, “Prerogatives Without Restriction”. Philosphical Perspectives. 6. (1992): 377-97. 
15
 Scheffler, “Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, And the Virtues,” 413. 
 The Ethics of Globalisation, Free Trade and Fair Trade  14 
wrongs to a world with fewer of these wrongs, then consequentialism is dealt a heavy blow 
(maybe even a fatal one). However, if it is paradoxical to prefer a world with more wrongs, all of 
a certain kind, to an otherwise identical world, except that it has less of these same wrongs, then 
consequentialism is justified as a foundation for morality, while it is its competitors that are 
disconfirmed.  Once the principle is established, then we can begin to tackle the more difficult 
questions about weighing one good against another and how properly to define utility etc.. 
Clearly, the claim that „it is paradoxical to prefer a world with more wrongs, all of a certain kind, 
to an otherwise identical world, except that it has less of these same wrongs,‟ is the most 
controversial, and if one denies it, then I must most certainly use my above far weaker argument, 
but at least this may serve to clarify the debate to its most simple form: do we prefer more or less 
immoral acts? 
The injustice objection is a problem that properly deserves to be addressed entirely on its 
own, and this has obviously been a merely precursory discussion of it. Clearly, not only is 
Scheffler‟s account that I have accepted not going to be accepted by many opponents of 
consequentialism, it will not even be accepted by many consequentialists themselves who wish 
to tackle the injustice objection not by meeting it head on but by modifying consequentialism 
even further. For this reason it is probably my first argument that I will need to rely upon, but I 
hope that there is at least a virtue in explaining the root of one‟s normative assumptions when 
doing applied ethics, even if the most crucial of those assumptions are largely uncontroversial. 
Finally, it is worth noting that there may be one philosophical position that allows one to 
deny both of my responses to the injustice objection. A few proponents of fair trade might argue 
that the reason that they are obligated to engage in fair trade is not because they are attempting to 
raise the total utility of developing countries, but because they simply are required to perform 
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certain ethical practices when interacting with people, and that these include the people that grow 
their coffee and their cocoa, for instance, even if they never meet them and there are several 
intermediaries between them who are also responsible for those goods. Thus, these fair traders 
feel morally obligated not exploit the producers of their food, so they are required to give them a 
premium for their goods, because it is them in particular who grew their food. However, beyond 
that they owe them nothing more. Therefore, even if it can be demonstrated that there is an 
alternative to fair trade that is less costly and more effective at increasing the welfare of the 
people that fair trade is designed to help, it may still be morally preferable for these fair traders 
to engage in fair trade instead of that better form of aid, because of this normative position that 
they hold. To these people I do not have an especially satisfactory response, other than to note 
that they may find at least a few reasons to support free trade and globalisation in the following 
chapters that do not need to involve them breaking their peculiar normative code. However for 
my own satisfaction, I may at least note that I suspect that they are indeed a small minority, and 
the majority of people who buy fair trade goods do so because they intend primarily to increase 
the welfare of developing countries; i.e., they intend to help the poor in developing countries as 
much as possible. 
Alienation Objection 
The Alienation Objection broadly asserts that a consequentialist agent would be alienated 
from her relationships and projects. I shall focus on how this alienation is commonly illustrated 
in two forms: first, it raises a series of concerns that come up between consequentialists and their 
friends, or rather problems that would arise between theoretical consequentialists and their 
friends. The second problem of alienation arises when consequentialists face moral dilemmas 
like those discussed above in the injustice objection. Let‟s start by describing the two problems, 
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first with the friends example. Then we shall move to the moral dilemmas‟ concern second. After 
outlining the two problems we can consider a commonly accepted solution –at least among 
consequentialists. 
The first objection goes like this: if consequentialists are to take their theory seriously, or 
if an actual agent were to act in such a way as a consequentialist theory says he should, then the 
result would be large scale alienation between him and many of his projects and relationships, 
for example his friends. The basic problem can be described as follows: a consequentialist 
should act to maximise utility, in all his actions, so he should be guided by this principle when he 
is picking and making friends. However, this risks alienating the consequentialist from the full 
good of friendship, and can create a paradox fatal to consequentialism. To illustrate, suppose I 
have a friend Brad, and the only reason that we became friends is entirely because, as I am such 
a contemptible person, Brad took pity upon me and realised that if he did not become my friend, 
then I would have no friends at all and be miserable. However, his relationship with me is not 
that of genuine friendship, even if he is extremely effective at maintaining the ruse that we are 
close friends, and I never suspect that his motivations are entirely consequentialist in origin. 
There is still a major problem. Brad is not experiencing friendship in the right way: he is 
alienated. Ironically, there would be a higher total utility, suppose, if he was not entirely guided 
by consequentialist moral theory but instead made friends in the ordinary manner and valued 
those friends for friendship‟s sake. Thus, consequentialism is self-defeating and therefore 
inadequate as a moral theory.
16
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Another similar problem arises when consequentialists come to moral dilemmas. Suppose 
several people are going to die, unless a consequentialist (for whatever reason) kills, in a rather 
gruesome fashion, a single person. The correct thing to do, given whatever theory of ethics is 
actually settled upon, may very well be to take that action, but the decision should be an 
agonising one, taken only with reluctance and regret, or so the objection maintains. However 
given consequentialism, it is actually only a simple problem of arithmetic to decide what is the 
correct action. Therefore, consequentialism alienates consequentialists from their humanity and 
is unacceptable, because a world where we are not alienated from our humanity is (presumably) 
better than the one where we are. Again, ironically, consequentialism is self-defeating, so it is 
inadequate and another theory of morality must be found.
 17
 
The solution to both problems, that I accept, is adopting a more sophisticated form of 
consequentialism, what is often called indirect or rule consequentialism.
18
 Unfortunately, 
throughout philosophical literature, these terms are not used entirely consistently. Thus, I will 
quickly outline the solution to this problem that I accept. To develop an adequate form of 
consequentialism, the first step is often to distinguish between a criterion of rightness and a 
decision procedure. The distinction makes clear that while we can still define our moral goal, 
(the criterion of rightness) as consequentialists, is the highest aggregate of utility, (although we 
may still need to abandon this too, which we shall discuss shortly in consideration of the 
demandingness objection) we accept that the best way to accomplish this is not necessarily to 
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attempt, as individuals, to maximise the good at all times (which is our decision procedure, i.e. 
how we decide to act, because we are consequentialists). This is because human beings are not 
dispassionate: we are not ideal moral agents, so we have to take this into account when we make 
decisions in cases where morality applies. It simply will not work to teach people to treat their 
family members and friends in exactly the same way as they would treat strangers, because if we 
did, then nobody would ever help anybody else move again. Further, people would become 
extremely unhappy, and the world where nobody establishes bonds of friendship and love that 
cause them to treat certain people preferentially to strangers, would be a world with less utility 
than the world where they do. Therefore, it is essential that as consequentialists we separate our 
decision procedure from our criterion of rightness, although in practice, presumably, they would 
not be radically different from each other, even if theoretically they could be.  
Another version of consequentialism, what I would call rule consequentialism (as 
opposed to indirect), is a possible solution to this problem, for example the position of Brad 
Hooker.
19
 Further, some variants of rule consequentialism (collective rule consequentialism) may 
have the additional benefit of side stepping the demandingness objection. However, due to space 
constraints I will not be discussing these versions, because I think they are generally much less 
plausible than other forms of consequentialism, especially due to an objection, often called the 
„collapse objection,‟ that argues that rule consequentialism reduces to a form of indirect act 
consequentialism.
20
 However, as always, these are my preferences, and the arguments that follow 
this chapter will be largely compatible with various forms of rule consequentialism, even if I do 
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not share their proponents‟ optimism for the many possible views of rule consequentialism 
themselves.  
Now let‟s elaborate on exactly how the proposed distinction between a criterion of 
rightness and a decision procedure allows us to solve the alienation objection. Let‟s do this by 
examining just one of the examples described above, what is now often called the „Pedro‟ 
thought experiment taken from Williams‟ “A Critique of Utilitarianism.” In this example a man 
(called Jim) is given the choice (by Pedro) of either shooting an innocent man himself or 
standing by and watching while that innocent man is shot, along with 19 other innocent people. 
First of all, it is crucial that there is actually a paradox, so we must assume that the possible 
world where Jim shoots the innocent man with no hesitation is worse, in consequentialist terms,
21
 
than the world where he hesitates and then, only after resolving himself to the horrible situation, 
does he shoot and presumably grieve (how most of us would expect) appropriately that action. If 
Jim behaves in exactly the way consequentialist theory tells him to behave, then the world is 
worse off than if another moral theory had guided his actions. To clarify, if Jim uses 
consequentialist theory as his sole motivation for every action he takes, then the world is worse 
off than if he didn‟t, because a consequentialist motivation doesn‟t allow him to properly engage 
in morality, which is taken to be desirable. If this were not the case, if the world where Jim does 
behave as a pure consequentialist and doesn‟t hesitate or feel remorse of any kind and this turns 
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out actually to be better than if he had grieved etc., then this objection is simply identical to the 
injustice objection discussed above, and we need not worry about it further. 
However,  the solution to the Pedro thought experiment (and other cases of alienation as 
well, like friendship) is not so much to refute its point, but to accept it and incorporate it into the 
theory. If Jim should motivate his actions in a non-consequentialist way to get the best 
consequences, (where in this case one of the consequences is how the actual act of deciding 
contributes to that utility) then that is exactly what he should do. To put it another way, one of 
the contributing factors to an individual‟s utility is how that individual feels about her own 
decision procedure, and what feelings the act of deciding generates. Thus, the world is described 
as best when there is no utility stone left unturned as it were: there is no way to get any more 
utility whatsoever. That is the criterion of rightness. How agents decide between one path or 
another is their decision procedure. Given that the decision procedures that agents use to make 
decisions affects total utility, then that must be accommodated by the consequentialist theory that 
we settle upon. Clearly then, the decision procedure that tells agents to act in such a way as to 
maximise utility as if their own decision procedure didn’t affect that total utility will in certain 
cases be less than optimal. Thus, when an agent‟s decision procedure (call it the optimal decision 
procedure) departs from the decision procedure that would cause that agent to act in the way that 
that agent would act in if her decision procedure didn‟t affect her own utility (and possibly 
others‟), and this second decision procedure would lead to total utility being diminished, then 
that decision procedure (the optimal one) should be adopted and the other abandoned. Finally, it 
is worth noting, as stated above, that  it is extremely unlikely that decision procedures that depart 
completely from consequentialism will actually lead to a higher total utility, though it is 
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conceivable, and in those theoretical cases the correct solution is to adopt an entirely 
consequentialist criterion of rightness and an entirely nonconsequentialist decision procedure. 
The solution to the alienation problem that I embrace is an individual, indirect, act 
consequentialist one, but unlike the collective rule consequentialist alternative mentioned above, 
it most certainly does not solve the demandingness objection. Thus, I will have to develop my 
theory further still. The final solution will then be a complete and nuanced theory that I accept, 
but I caution again, it is simply the form that I prefer. There may well be better answers to these 
objections, and provided that they allow an adequate principle of beneficence and a 
maximisation principle, then for our purposes they should suffice just as well, if not even better.  
The Demandingness Objection 
Perhaps the most famous objection to consequentialism is the demandingness objection. 
This objection states that consequentialism must be false because it expects far too much of us. 
The objection takes the following form: if we accept consequentialism, then we have to accept 
that if somebody can make a small sacrifice to increase greatly the welfare of another human 
being or many other human beings, then that person must do so to act morally and not to do so is 
to act immorally. However, if we apply this to our world, we can see that we, those of us lucky 
enough to be living in developed countries and able to devote much of our time to engaging in 
pursuits such as considering the demandingness objection, are in this position ourselves. We 
could easily make a small sacrifice that would greatly increase the welfare of another human 
being. We could make a small sacrifice that would save lives. Further, once we had made that 
small sacrifice, there would be another small sacrifice that would also be possible. That sacrifice 
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too would save lives.
22
 Many philosophers have argued that a consequence of consequentialism 
is that we should all continue to donate to charity until we reach the point where we are no 
longer better off than the people we are obligated to help in this way. However, this is absurdly 
too demanding, therefore consequentialism is false.
23
 
The problem arises given either of the two normative principles that I explicitly endorsed 
above: we should maximise the good, provided that it doesn’t violate other ethical restrictions or 
we should take action to help others that are greatly in need, if we have it within our reasonable 
power to do so, even if we have no significant relations with those people and owe no other 
obligations to them. The question becomes what is within our reasonable power to help those in 
need. Taken to the extreme, virtually any action that we can take to help people who are starving 
would appear to be required by a consequentialist theory of morality. If an average person living 
in our society gave over half of her income to the poor in developing countries every year, then it 
is almost certain that the total utility in the world would increase.
24
 While she would certainly 
find that her life style was diminished, she would save many lives and more than compensate for 
the relatively small loss in utility that she herself would suffer with such a sacrifice. 
It is especially important to note that much of the literature and discussion of the 
demandingness objection is due largely to the famous essay “Famine Affluence and Morality” by 
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Peter Singer.
25
 In this paper and in later work,
26
 Singer adopts the extreme position of accepting 
that we are required to commit such personal sacrifices. However, it is important to recognise 
that both of these are chiefly works in applied ethics, while the demandingness objection itself is 
purely normative. Because of the conditions in developing Africa, it is often seen as a paradigm 
case for considering the demandingness objection. The arguments that I will be providing in the 
coming chapters can be applied directly to the applied ethics question of what we should do help 
people living in developing countries around the world, and is to an extent a reply to Singer‟s 
position. However, my arguments do not touch upon the theoretical problem of demandingness 
as a normative question, and if the demandingness objection is effective, even if my arguments  
largely alleviates it in the case of Africa in our world, then consequentialism will fail as an 
adequate moral theory and will not stand as the foundation for my project after all. Thus, I will 
now consider the demandingness objection as purely a theoretically normative problem, posed as 
an objection to consequentialism.  
There have been many attempted solutions to the demandingness objection. I will briefly 
outline what is considered to be one, if not the most, promising solution. This promising solution 
is to adopt a weaker form of consequentialism than has been described so far: this general 
strategy is often called „moderate consequentialism.‟ In simple consequentialism the goal is 
entirely the maximisation of utility. A moderate stance accepts that we need a theory where this 
is not always the case. One prominent form of this is Scheffler‟s „Hybrid View,‟ and it is this 
position that I will now describe. 
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 The Hybrid view allows consequentialists, in certain circumstances, to put their own 
interests ahead of an alternative programme that would maximise utility. “[Hybrid conceptions] 
retain the initially plausible consequentialist idea that it is always permissible to do what would 
lead to the best overall outcome, while at the same time accommodating those anti-
consequentialist intuitions that do seem theoretically well-founded.”27 The mechanics of 
Scheffler‟s theory involve the adoption of an „agent centered prerogative‟ that Scheffler 
introduces in The Rejection of Consequentialism and describes in more detail in “Prerogatives 
Without Restrictions.”28 Broadly to summarise, an act is permissible for an agent, if that agent 
gains M times more utiles than is lost totally by doing P rather than A. Thus, an act P is 
permitted if (Ui (P) - Ui (A))*M > (Ut (A) - Ut(P)), where P is the state of affairs created by the 
preferred act for the agent, A is the state of affairs given the utility maximising act, Ui is a 
function that gives the utility for the individual agent, given a state of affairs, and Ut is a function 
that gives the total utility in the world, given a state of affairs.
29
 Of course, after adopting such a 
position, the debate turns to finding an adequate multiplier to reduce the demands of 
consequentialism to a more acceptable level, but not so much as to eliminate our  moral 
obligations completely.  
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Combined Consequentialism 
Finally, solving both the alienation and demandingness objection requires constructing an 
intricate theory of consequentialism. Tim Mulgan in The Demands of Consequentialism puts 
forward such a view. Mulgan draws a distinction between what he calls the realm of necessity 
and the realm of reciprocity. Our interactions with agents is then defined into one of these two 
realms depending on our and that agent‟s circumstances. The distinction between the two realms 
is drawn because of a further distinction between needs and goals. Mulgan argues that an 
adequate theory of consequentialism has to define wellbeing in such way as to accommodate 
these as being separate. We will discuss defining utility in more depth in the following section, 
but the essential feature of Mulgan‟s position is that we must treat differently people who are not 
having their needs met, from people who have their basic needs for survival met and are 
pursuing a variety of goals and that come into direct contact with us. Essentially, our relationship 
to people in developing countries is within the realm of necessity, while our relationship with 
other people living in developed western nations is normally one of reciprocity. Mulgan 
describes a consequentialist position that utilises a hybrid theory (though he modifies Scheffler‟s 
original position by adjusting M depending upon the benefits P creates for the agent, this has the 
effect of smoothing out some other difficulties that can arise for the traditional hybrid account, 
but due to space constraints, we shall not consider further)
30
 for the realm of necessity, and one 
that uses an indirect account in the realm of reciprocity. 
This position is especially intuitively plausible when tackling the demandingness 
objection, because it is difficult, if not impossible, to have a consequentialist account of morality 
that is adequate for solving the moral questions that we come across in our everyday lives, that 
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applies effectively to demandingness. That being said, there are presumably many ways to 
accommodate this distinction effectively. One may adopt one‟s own definition of utility that does 
not allow for the separation of needs and goals as Mulgan‟s solution does. It would still be quite 
plausible that another distinction similar to that of reciprocity and necessity could be drawn, and 
that this distinction too would allow for a combined approach of a hybrid view that applies to our 
dealings with people that we do not come into regular contact with (like those in great need in 
Africa), and an indirect or rule consequentialist account that describes morality as it applies to 
those with which we do have regular contact. 
Thus I accept a combined hybrid act consequentialist normative theory. I employ a 
distinction between a criterion of rightness and a decision procedure to solve the alienation 
objection and I accept that both an agent centered prerogative and a further distinction that 
separates people living in the developed world from the undeveloped that mitigates demands 
upon the people living in the developed world further still. However, I fully accept that much aid 
is required and that the principle of beneficence requires us to aid people in the developing and 
undeveloped world, so these distinctions in no way destroy our obligations to the poor. They just 
temper them to the point where we are not required to reduce ourselves to poverty to help them. 
1.3 Defining Utility and Rationality, Globalisation, and Poverty and Development 
Utility and Rationality 
A normal and important step in fully developed consequentialist approaches to ethics is 
defining utility or welfare, and rationality. For our purposes it is not necessary to specify either 
rigorously: we shall leave both largely undefined, though I shall lay out a few of the issues at 
stake. In this essay, I take utility to be basic; I do this for two reasons: first, I think it is a 
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plausible philosophical position to begin with. Secondly, the normative theory that I have 
adopted is supposed to be only a generally consequentialist one. Therefore, either one can accept 
that the notion of utility is basic and cannot be defined in absolute terms, but that we understand 
it well enough to use it effectively, or one may substitute one‟s own preferred form of utility. I 
will attempt to make my own views more clear, while exploring some of the issues surrounding 
utility. Further, I shall assume that agents are, for the most part, rational, and I define rational as 
follows: an agent is rational if she always acts to maximise her own welfare. The cases where we 
are not rational are either because we are mistaken somehow in what our actions (or possible 
actions that we are considering) will accomplish (for example, we might think that an action will 
lead to the satisfaction of a certain one of our preferences when in fact it will not), or because we 
are choosing to ignore our own welfare, for example when we are constraining ourselves due to 
morality. This is not to say that I think that acting morally is irrational in the way that the term is 
broadly used in discourse, rather that it is not rational in the way that it is generally applied in 
standard economic theory, which is how for the moment I am using the term. For example, when 
choosing between options on a dessert menu at one‟s favourite restaurant, one chooses the option 
that will lead to one‟s own greatest satisfaction. Thus, rationality (in the economic sense of the 
word) is the disposition to engage in the behaviour that brings about the most welfare for the 
agent in question. 
The most common approach to utility in economic and consequentialist theory has been 
that of preference satisfaction. In this approach we are all assumed to have different degrees of 
preferences for certain goods and services as well as our own free time. If it is assumed that we 
are rational as I have defined the term above, then we maximise our own utility through selecting 
and actively pursuing our individual optimum balance of all of these preferences. As each of us 
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has, to some extent, our own unique preferences, we behave quite differently from each other. 
One person may seek employment in a high paying but demanding job that doesn‟t allow much 
time off, while another, who values his free time more highly might select a lower paying job, 
but with less hours. Thus, in standard economic theory utility and rationality go hand in hand, 
and a huge amount of human behaviour is explained by it, especially what is generally 
considered to be economic behaviour, such as working, investing, and trading.  
 However, this position leads to a rather surprising conclusion: we are all as happy as we 
can possible be, even the people who we might think are especially unhappy. Consider an 
unemployed homeless person. Given this standard approach of taking utility to consist entirely of 
preference satisfaction of rational agents, we are forced to accept that this person is generally as 
happy as he can be. Now that may not be very happy, but assuming that he maximises his utility 
by balancing his preferences accordingly and that he is completely rational in the standard use of 
the term in economics, then we have to conclude that working to provide an income adequate to 
buy shelter would not be the ideal balance of his preferences, or that‟s what he would do. We 
might say that he simply values his free time much more highly than the average person, or that 
perhaps strangely he is unaware of the benefit of shelter. Unfortunately, both of these answers 
are preposterous. 
Clearly, something has to give, and my solution is to modify the preference satisfaction 
component of utility.
31
 Unfortunately, I cannot elaborate as far as I would like to on what utility 
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is. As I have said, I consider it a basic concept that cannot be completely specified. The reason 
we use it is because it is extremely effective when doing economics and attempting to solve 
problems such as poverty. My concept of utility is a blend of the following hierarchy: the 
fulfillment of the needs for survival, establishing and achieving our own goals or projects (for 
example running a marathon, or starting a family) and living comfortably (for example with 
internal plumbing and access to sought after consumer goods). Thus the more of these that a 
person has, the higher the utility that person enjoys. By adopting this basic definition of utility, 
we solve the above problem. The homeless man is behaving irrationally (in the normal use of the 
word), because he has irrational preferences as it were. To maximise his true (basic) utility, as 
opposed to only his preferences, he should be working to provide shelter for himself. In An 
Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution Dasgupta writes “we will call the degree to which a 
person is flourishing his flow of well-being. For analytical convenience we will on occasion 
think of it as a numerical measure of flourishing. But the concept is elusive, and at the end we 
will arrive at only a very limited understanding of it, and that too circuitously.”32 This captures, I 
think, the approach that I wish to take to utility. Though, it is worth mentioning that Dasgupta 
continues in An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution to define wellbeing considerably further, 
by including both a preference satisfaction account, as well as access to the goods needed to 
survive and a description of freedom, that I take to be an attempt to formalise what I described 
above as the ability to pursue one‟s own projects. I don‟t share Dasgupta‟s optimism for finding 
                                                                                                                                                             
preferences that are, using the ordinary meaning of the word, irrational, which is why I focus on them as being the 
culprit. 
32
 Partha Dasgupta, An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 34 
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such a well defined solution, but if such a solution is possible, then this is surely as good a start 
as any other.
33
 
There is another famous problem for defining utility effectively: Nozick‟s experience 
machine thought experiment.
34
 Nozick‟s experience machine is an attempt to thwart another 
proposal for defining utility, that of hedonism. A hedonist believes that utility is simply pleasure, 
and that a utility maximising world is one in which the most amount of pleasure is realised. 
Nozick proposes that perhaps a machine could be built that causes any user of that machine to 
experience great pleasure. This could be an equal amount of pleasure to that of achieving many 
great things, possibly the achievement of far more great things than any person could actually 
accomplish. The details of exactly how the machine works are irrelevant, so long as it is assumed 
that whatever kind of fulfilment that is defined as the ideal good is achieved. He then asks the 
question, if such a machine was possible, would you allow yourself to be put in it and left in it 
for the rest of your life (assuming of course that your life would last the same length as before)? 
The conclusion that he is motivating is that one should refuse, because there is more to life than 
simply the experience of whatever pleasure one would get in the machine. Nozick‟s thought 
experiment is widely seen as a decisive counterexample to hedonism. It can be made even 
stronger, perhaps, by considering a machine that would replicate the life one was already going 
to have. Suppose that plugging oneself into the machine would not change the phenomenal 
character of your life in the slightest; the machine would be able to detect exactly how your life 
would have gone had you not plugged into it, and produced the identical experiences for you, as 
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 Formally, Dasgupta defines an individual K‟s welfare as follows, where U is function of an agent‟s preferences, a 
is vector of all actions taken by all agents, H is the state of an agent, Q is a function of an agent‟s freedom, A is the 
set of actions that an agent can plausibly take, and a–k is the vector of all actions except K‟s: Wk(Uk(a; Hk), Qk(Ak(a–
k, Hk)). Thus Wk is made up of Uk and Qk, which are dependent on, in the case of Uk the state of K and the vector 
(what might be thought of as the equilibrium) of all agent‟s actions and, in the case of Qk, what is actually  possible 
for K, given the state of affairs, and what every other agent will do. (60-70) 
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 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Malden: Blackwell, 2008). 
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if you had not in fact plugged into it. Would you then plug into the machine? Surely the answer 
is no, because we value, at least to some extent, genuine experience. However, a hedonist would 
have no way of distinguishing between the two choices, as far as she would be concerned it 
would make no difference to her whether she was plugged in or not. While Nozick‟s experience 
machine targets hedonism, it is clearly an objection that all accounts of utility must overcome, 
and I suggest that my solution accomplishes this, because this intuition can be easily added to the 
mixture. It is the virtue of defining utility as basic that we don‟t need any more of an explanation 
of why utility captures the correct intuitions than simply the fact that those are our intuitions and 
therefore need to be captured by it. This may not be satisfactory to those who demand more 
rigour in their concepts, but then they are welcome to try and define utility more definitely. 
Given my project, I would be happy, even if I had a definite definition of utility that I 
preferred, to allow almost any other definition of utility to stand as the foundation of this project, 
because it is irrelevant to this discussion. Either hedonism or a preference satisfaction account 
would work fine, for example. And in the end, my affinity for defining utility as basic is a 
pessimism towards doing any better. Time will tell whether a satisfactory account will arise, but 
it is clear that the notion of utility is indispensible, and it is clear that even if we cannot define it 
perfectly, that we all know what it is in the end. We know what makes lives worth living and 
what does not, so in the mean time we can at least use the concept effectively, not only to do 
philosophy but economics, which is certainly worthwhile. My position is simply that I suspect 
this is all we are going to get, and further we don‟t need to do any better, if it is indeed the case 
that we cannot do any better. 
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Globalisation 
By globalisation I mean the following: the least hindered trade between as many people 
as possible; in effect this means the destruction of obstacles to trade such as subsidies and tariffs 
across national borders (what I shall henceforth call free trade). Secondly, the implementation of 
free market economic systems in undeveloped regions, and industrialisation and the division of 
labour in those countries. As for the second part, I am prepared to accept a fairly loose version of 
this. I consider all western nations to have implemented the kind of policies that I espouse, so I 
am not limiting myself only to, what many might consider, very right wing economic systems. I 
am happy to include what is often called „the market friendly approach,‟ as the guiding principles 
of what globalisation should entail, though I must admit to preferring what is commonly called 
the Washington Consensus
35
 or at least something similar to it, given that the Washington 
Consensus is now a rather vague notion. Thus, for my purposes globalisation has two distinct 
halves: the first is free trade, and the second is western style economic practices and technology; 
i.e., industrialisation and the adoption of free market economies (as opposed to command 
economies and ones with massive and unnecessary regulation). In the following section I will 
outline what the standard benefits of these two halves of my definition bring to societies in 
general, and how we can understand them using the tools of consequentialist theory.  
This definition of globalisation leaves open an objection along the lines that I am 
promoting cultural imperialism. However, rather than modify my definition of globalisation to 
try and accommodate this objection, I will attempt to meet this objection head on in the final 
chapter of this essay, in section 4.1. 
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 The „Washington Consensus‟ as a term was coined by John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy 
Reform,” Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington: Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 1990). It is however commonly used in a far more broad way than in his original formulation of the 
term to describe generally neo-liberal policy. 
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Poverty and Development 
One of the greatest obstacles to solving effectively the problem of world poverty is an  
improper understanding of it. Poverty should not be understood in purely relative terms. If 
poverty is understood in relative terms, then it blends with inequality (which, although it is 
certainly not something that is to be desired, is a separate problem with separate solutions), and it 
creates the illusion that growth in the developed world (and any force that creates more growth in 
the developed world than in the undeveloped, like globalisation, especially in the short term, 
very possibly does) is a negative force. Using the basic definition of utility that I outlined above 
allows us not to fall into this trap. This problem can occur whenever a policy or action creates 
more wealth in an already developed country than in a developing one, even when it does in fact 
help the developing country. 
For example, suppose that a manufacturing plant in a developed western country is built, 
and it creates a considerable amount of jobs and goods in that country, which are enjoyed 
primarily by that country‟s citizens. However, a call centre is created in an undeveloped country, 
because the company that owns the new manufacturing centre needs it to sell and service 
effectively the goods that the new plant is making. This could very easily be seen as an event that 
creates rather than dispels poverty, if poverty is defined in a such a way that the relative wealth 
of others is a crucial component in its definition. With an absolute view of poverty, this problem 
is dodged. Any act or event that creates wealth in the developing and undeveloped world will be 
correctly seen as a benefit, effectively diminishing poverty, and not exacerbating it. 
It may seem very counterintuitive to view poverty in this way, because, it may be 
objected that clearly people living in undeveloped countries are poor relative to us, and surely it 
 The Ethics of Globalisation, Free Trade and Fair Trade  34 
is our relative wealth that obligates us to help them. Further, it seems wrong to say that before 
the industrial revolution, what are now considered to be, undeveloped countries were poor, even 
though the quality of life in them was not any better than it is today. Also, surely the people 
living in, what are now, developed countries would have had no obligations to the people living 
in, what are now, the developing and undeveloped world, because their lives were not 
significantly (if at all) better than those peoples‟ lives. Further, by this definition, everybody 
would have been poor in these preindustrial times, regardless of how wealthy they were 
compared to the rest of the population, because all, or virtually all, of us living in the developed 
world today have access to goods and services that benefit us far more than even the most 
extravagant luxuries, that were available in those times, benefited the very rich of those days.  
This superficially leaves us with a dilemma: either we view poverty as a relative concept, 
and people in undeveloped parts of the world are poor only because we are so affluent, or we 
view poverty as absolute, and we have to conclude that before the industrial revolution 
everybody was poor, lords as well as peons. My solution is to define poverty as follows. Poverty 
is a lack of utility (defined in absolute terms), when that utility is possible to obtain. This neatly 
solves our dilemma. People living in undeveloped areas of the world today are poor, because it is 
possible to raise them to our living standards and increase their utility, but the lords of medieval 
and prior times were wealthy, given my definition, because there was no available technology or 
practices that could dramatically increase their wellbeing. Finally, this view of poverty is 
consistent with a consequentialist morality, because it fits cleanly with principle of beneficence 
that I have already accepted. We are obligated to help solve the problem of world poverty, 
because we have developed technology and practices which allow us to do so. Thus, I define 
development as simply the raising of utility levels in the parts of the world where people are poor 
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to similar levels as those enjoyed in developed countries. As we shall see, by far the best way to 
achieve this is not through fair trade, but through globalisation and free trade. 
1.4 Benefits of Adopting Consequentialism 
There is another benefit to adopting consequentialism, or at least of using the language of 
consequentialism. It allows us to describe the benefits of development clearly. We can now 
consider how several of the definitions which I have given in the previous section can be 
combined to describe two pertinent ways in which people increase their wellbeing, through trade 
and technological innovation. The consequentialist framework that I am employing proves 
especially useful in describing the benefits to society that trade and technology bring. 
Let‟s begin with trade, which is pertinent to our discussion in two ways. First, trade 
simply increases the utility of the parties involved, assuming that they are rational, because 
agents that are rational only take actions that benefit rather than harm themselves. This can be 
illustrated with the following example. Suppose that there are two people (Alison and Barney), 
both of which enjoy mountain biking, but that one of those people, Alison, enjoys mountain 
biking considerably more than Barney does. Alison owns, as we might expect, a much nicer 
mountain bike than Barney, (suppose that it costs £1000 to buy). 
Barney does not enjoy mountain biking nearly enough to justify such a bike, so he has a 
much less expensive model that he uses. He would prefer the same model that Alison uses to the 
one that he has, but he is only prepared to pay £500 for it, because he could find another use for 
any more money than that, which he would enjoy even more. In other words, had he spent his 
money on this more expensive bike, he would not have been maximising his personal utility, 
because there was another option that would have created a better result for him. As he is rational 
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in the way that we defined above, he chose not to buy that model of bike at that price and bought 
instead a cheaper one for an amount of money that did maximise his personally utility. 
Now let‟s suppose that Alison decides to buy an even more expensive mountain bike than 
the one she already possesses, and this greatly decreases the value of her first bike to her, 
because now that she has a new bike, she has a far reduced use for her old one. Let‟s assume that 
it is now worth only £100 to her, as a stand-in that she would use on the rare days when her new 
bike needs to be sent to the shop for maintenance. 
Suddenly, there is an opportunity for a trade. Barney can buy Alison‟s old bike and create 
a surplus of utility (which for simplicity‟s sake, for now we shall leave in Pound Sterling). As 
long as Barney offers more than £100 for the bike, Alison will be better off than she was before, 
by however much more than £100 Barney offers. And as long as Alison demands no more than 
£500, Barney will be better off by £500 less whatever he pays. There is exactly £400 worth of 
surplus to be had, and depending on the bargaining position (and bargaining skills) of the two 
agents involved, that surplus will split between them. Thus if Barney pays £400 for the bike, he 
will enjoy £100 of the surplus, while Alison will enjoy £300 of it, or if Barney pays £200, then 
he will enjoy £300 of it, while Alison would have a surplus of £100. 
The above example uses pounds, but it can work just as well using utility. We can change 
the appropriate amounts to utils and the example yields a similar result. Alison gets 100 utils 
from her old bike (having it increases her personal utility by 100) once she has acquired her new 
one. Barney would get 500 from it, which is less than the equivalent amount of utils that the 
£1000 would bring him needed to buy the same model of mountain bike from the bike shop. 
Alison and Barney will trade so long as the amount of money that changes hands is worth more 
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than 100 utils to Alison and less than 500 utils to Barney. In fact, this second example illustrates 
far more accurately how economic transactions occur, because obviously utility doesn‟t correlate 
perfectly to currency, as different people will value currency differently, depending, among other 
things, on how much of it they already have. However, while not correlating perfectly with 
utility, currency is a fairly effective guide to utility, because it is currency that people trade for 
the goods and services that they want, and currency is in general far more easy to quantify than 
utility, so it is often easier to use money rather than utility when doing economics, and thinking 
about problems that economics especially pertains to, like development and poverty. 
Further, it is worth noting that the relationship between a worker and an employer is 
essentially the same as the simple example given above. A worker works for a company, if that 
company will give that employee more money (or utility) than that employee can get elsewhere, 
and a company will hire an employee if that company will be able to sell the goods or services 
for more money than it has to pay that employee in wages. Again, it is the bargaining power of 
the two sides that determines how this surplus is divided between them. If there is a labour 
shortage and high demand for labour, then the employee can be expected to receive a larger 
share, while if there is a labour surplus and many people all competing for a single job, then the 
employer will have the advantage and claim a higher percentage of the surplus. 
The second way trade is generally viewed to benefit a society is through comparative 
advantage. This principle states that a country is better off trading a good that it can produce to a 
second country that can already make that good for less than the first country. This can be 
illustrated on an individual basis with a similar example as Alison and Barney.
36
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Suppose that a surgeon and a philosophy graduate student are living as neighbours. The 
surgeon makes £200/hour, while the graduate student makes a more modest £12/hour working as 
a TA. Let‟s also assume that the surgeon needs to tend to menial tasks in her garden once a week 
and this takes up an hour of her time, which she could be working as a surgeon.
37
 The graduate 
student is a relatively ineffective gardener, and it takes him 2 hours to do the same job to her one. 
However, if she employs him to do the task (and spends the hour she saves working), despite his 
horticultural ineptitude, she is advantaged so long as she pays him no more than £100/hour. 
Similarly, so long as the graduate student is paid more than the £12/hour that he could otherwise 
be making as a TA, he is advantaged as well. Thus, even though the surgeon is a better gardener 
than the graduate student, they are both advantaged by him performing that task. 
Another pertinent point is how this ties into the importance of defining poverty properly, 
as absolute rather than relative. The above example clearly enhances the lives of both parties and 
is a utility gain to the world as a whole,
38
 but assuming that the bargaining position of the highly 
paid surgeon is superior to the graduate student, (not an unlikely assumption given the relatively 
unskilled nature of the work) it is probable that the wage that is settled upon will be much closer 
to the £12/hour that is the minimum he will accept, rather than the £100/hour which she will not 
pay above. Suppose that they settle upon £15/hour. Let‟s also assume that they continue to work 
the same amount of time in total as they would have before, but only in the new jobs. The 
graduate student will work 2 hours more as a gardener and 2 hours less as a TA than he was 
before, and he will make £30 in those two hours rather than the £24 he would have otherwise. 
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 Further, the reason that surgeons are so highly compensated for their work is because it provides a valuable 
service to society on the whole, so there is even an additional benefit to society, as there will now be an additional 
hour of medical treatment being provided in general. However, this is a benefit that is harder to quantify exactly in 
this example, so I will only mention it here as an aside.  
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The surgeon will also work the same amount of time as before, but she will make £200 in that 
hour, less the £30 she pays to the graduate student. While the graduate student is benefited by £6, 
the surgeon is benefited by £170. Thus, this mutually beneficial relationship will have the effect 
of increasing inequality considerably, while it will also reduce poverty. It is important that we 
define poverty in such a way that the inequality (which while not a good thing in itself) doesn‟t 
tarnish the benefit to the poorer participant to such an extent that it appears as a negative rather 
than a positive force for all concerned. 
A similar phenomenon may often happen with globalisation, and it is often assumed that 
the growth created is negative, because of the inequality of the distribution of that growth, but 
inequality and poverty are separate problems. It is essential to focus on the increase in total 
utility for both sides (especially for the poorer graduate student, even if he only enjoys a small 
amount of the surplus created), because in real terms poverty is reduced. The graduate student in 
the above example now has £6 more to spend on food (or beer) than he had before, and in the 
developing world starvation is a far more acute problem than inequality, and food is cheap 
enough that a little growth can go a long way to alleviating starvation. 
Finally, let‟s consider how it is possible to understand the benefits that technological and 
production innovation bring to a society through economic and consequentialist terms. It is clear 
that one of the major reasons why we enjoy a much higher standard of living than our ancestors 
before the industrial revolution is because of both superior technology and practices, such as the 
division of labour and economies of scale. By using economic and consequentialist terms as 
defined in the previous section, we can very effectively explain how these advances create 
utility. Let‟s consider the example of a small town with 100 people living in it. 
 The Ethics of Globalisation, Free Trade and Fair Trade  40 
For simplicity‟s sake let‟s assume that this town is inhabited with only working adults. 
Let‟s also assume that all of the inhabitants are perfectly rational, in the sense defined in the 
previous section. That is, every person does exactly what will maximise his or her own personal 
utility, and each person knows exactly how to do this. They all work just as hard and as long as 
they want to, to earn just enough money to buy the goods and services that they want. If any of 
them worked any less, then there would be a good or a service that he or she would not be able to 
afford that would be worth working a little extra for, and if any one worked any more, then there 
would be no good or service that would be as valuable as the equivalent amount of free time that 
that person lost in the process which that person could buy. We will also assume that there is no 
cost in changing professions to deliver a different good or service. Effectively, our little town is a 
perfectly efficient economy. 
Thus, in this town all the jobs that create the most utility to society are being filled, if a 
person becomes a butcher, it is because that is the service that is most in demand from the 
population, and thus by providing it that person will maximise his return, because he will be able 
to charge more for that service than any other alternative and by that means maximise his utility. 
If he selected a less in demand service to fulfill, then people would value their free time more 
highly than that other service sooner than had he been a butcher, and he would therefore reduce 
the amount that he could charge for that service, and this would clearly not maximise his utility. 
Thus, if the town has no butcher, it is because there is some other service that is demanded more 
highly from the population as a whole than butchery, and it would be a utility loss for the town 
were it to have a butcher, because it would necessarily come at the expense of something else 
more important. 
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It is important to note that this is only the ideal society assuming that all the people in the 
town are ideally rational in the economic sense of the word. It is very possible that if people 
sacrifice their own wellbeing for the good of others, then there may be an even higher possible 
utility score, but for the sake of this example we shall leave that possibility aside. 
Let‟s assume that the town has 4 farmers, and that these farmers produce all the grain that 
the townspeople need. Let‟s also assume that the farmers have plenty of farmable land, and that 
the reason that anyone of them doesn‟t produce more grain is simply because she is limited by 
her own manual labour. Let‟s also assume that nobody maintains a golf a course for the town 
(and that there is no antique dealer or goat cheese maker in town either), because all townsfolk 
are employed in more utility maximising jobs. However, the service that people want the most 
that they do not have access to is a golf course, followed by an antique dealer and then a goat 
cheese maker. We can describe the town by listing all of its inhabitants 1-100 and each of their 
jobs as well as the average utility that those jobs provide to the citizens of the town.  Let‟s 
suppose that the utility created by the different jobs that people provide looks like this.
39
 
Job   Citizen # Utility provided on average to a citizen of the town 
Farmer (x4)  1,2,3,4  800 (200 each) 
Clothier  5  160 
Builder  6  140 
 ...   7-96  70 (on average) 
Baker   97  30 
Florist   98  25 
Hair Dresser  100  20 
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externalities etc. The point that it is trying to illustrate is a simple one however, purely how the benefits of 
technological advances can be understood effectively in terms of consequentialist terminology. 
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Greens Keeper x  18 
Hairdresser  x  17 
Goat Cheese Maker x  16 
 
Thus, the average person receives 7405 utils from the goods and services provided by the 
jobs that the citizens of the town perform. Now suppose that a new technology is developed (like 
a tractor that allows one to plough far more land than could be ploughed before) that enables 
farmers to vastly improve their productivity. Suddenly, where four farmers were needed to 
perform the most vital task in the town, providing grain, now only one is required. Because this 
town is perfectly efficient, immediately three of the farmers switch to new jobs, while the other 
farmer uses the tractor to continue to farm and produce four times as much food as he was 
before. The economy still has an equal amount of food in it, so the utility provided by farming 
remains the same. However, now three more jobs are being performed than before, and there is a 
surplus of 51 utils created. One farmer begins to maintain a golf course, while another takes up 
antique dealing, and the last becomes a goat cheese maker, and each person in the town enjoys 
7456 utils on average provided by the goods and services that the towns people create through 
their labour. Crucially, the amount of people in the town has remained constant, but the amount 
of utility that they each enjoy has increased. This is the benefit of superior technology and 
practices, and we shall see in chapter 3 how globalisation uses this force to help the developing 
and the undeveloped world. 
A similar process to this, only on a much larger scale occurred in developed countries 
since the industrial revolution. Industrial agriculture means that now most developed countries 
devote less than 5% of their labour forces to agriculture, while developing countries commonly 
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have over half of their labour forces engaged in agricultural activities.
40
 Clearly a far larger 
amount of people in developing countries farm than in developed ones. This is obviously 
because food is such a basic need, and any person unable to find other work will naturally try to 
produce food so as to at least feed herself and her family. But this also illustrates the importance 
of an industrialised economy. 
 It is impossible for a number of the jobs that are essential for our quality of life in 
developed countries to be performed with such a large portion of the population farming, and 
hence the goods and services that those jobs would provide are not available in developing 
countries. These jobs never will be performed when there are such shortages of food (which is 
perhaps a good reason to provide it in the form of aid, but a far better solution is to develop 
economies that produce food within those countries). In a developed economy being a trained air 
traffic controller is a valuable skill, which is why air traffic controllers are well compensated for 
their labour, but in an undeveloped economy like Niger, it is a nearly worthless skill, because not 
only are there no airports to work in, even if there were, there would be almost nobody prepared 
to spend his money on such frivolities as air travel, when he is barely able to feed himself and his 
family, let alone have indoor plumbing. 
It is generally well accepted that trade and technological advances improve our lives. But 
these phenomena are especially well described using economic language, and economic 
language is effectively the language of consequentialism. Thus, a considerable benefit to 
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discussing development and globalisation is adopting a consequentialist moral theory, because 
the question of how to bring development about is largely one of economics. 
1.5 Economics and Philosophy 
At times, it may appear that my project treads dangerously close to the field of 
economics. Not that doing economics is in any way an ignoble pursuit, but that it is only an 
appropriate pursuit within that actual discipline. Thus in this section I will deal with two 
concerns: first, that I am actually doing economics and not philosophy at all. Secondly, I will 
examine the close connection between consequentialsim and economics (especially normative 
economics) and the dependence of the latter on the former and not the other way around. I will 
also attempt to meet certain criticisms levied towards moral theories that utilise economics. 
As my topic will centre around the moral issues concerning developing countries, it is 
essential that, as a consequentialist, I focus on what economic theories can tell us about how 
countries develop and what policies help and hinder this cause. Similarly, if my topic was how 
ordinary citizens can foster world peace (perhaps even more ambitious a project) and prevent 
conflicts and wars, as a consequentialist, I would need to concern myself with, among many 
other things, the theories of International Relations. However, such an endeavour would not 
constitute work in the discipline of International Relations, because there would be no new 
ground being broken in that field. The project would instead focus on what we should do, given 
what International Relations‟ theories tell us about how wars are created and prevented, to foster 
world peace. While doing so, it would be appropriate to explain and summarise these theories. It 
would also be necessary to justify using certain theories of international relations as opposed to 
others, and it would be necessary to justify the effectiveness of the theories that one settles upon, 
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but it would only be necessary to justify these theories to the extent required to create a 
compelling work of philosophy. Largely, why the theories themselves are correct would be a 
question for the field of International Relations. However, what we should do because those 
theories are correct, is a question for applied ethics, and this is what my project attempts to do, 
and hence this is what my project attempts to be –a work of applied ethics. 
Thus, my project will use a fair bit of economic theory. I will attempt to justify the 
economic theory that I use to the extent that it is controversial. As a consequentialist, it is 
absolutely essential to focus on the consequences of our actions and policies, and it is economics 
that provides us with those, and that is why I require it, not because I am doing economics and 
smuggling it into philosophy. 
It is important to emphasise that the relationship between consequentialist ethics and 
economics that I assume has a distinct hierarchy. It is consequentialism that grounds normative 
economics. First we assume that the best world is one where as many people as possible have as 
high a utility as possible. Then we set out trying to figure out how to accomplish this. It is here 
that we begin to use economics and begin to make the assumptions that are keystones of 
economic theory, such as everybody being rational (in the economic sense of the term) etc. This 
results in substantial criticism of such philosophy however, because without the proper 
hierarchy, these assumptions become rooted in the normative position rather than the economic 
theory. 
So let us now look at this criticism, that philosophy that relies too heavily upon economic 
theories and assumptions is inadequate. For example, Mulgan criticises Guathier‟s theory of 
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Contractarianism
41
 for relying too heavily upon (especially) a preference satisfaction account of 
utility, and he generalises this to many similar contractarian and consequentialist theories as 
well.
42
 He charges that Gauthier both “Ignores basic needs, as his bargaining situation implicitly 
assumes that individuals can survive without interacting.” And “Gauthier‟s account of rationality 
ignores the subtle complexity of goals, especially their interpersonal competitive rather than 
cooperative terms.”43,44  
Mulgan‟s second criticism is the most easily circumvented of the two, especially by 
accepting the solution that I adopted earlier and rejecting the preference satisfaction account of 
utility, (something that Mulgan would himself be sympathetic to) but it is Mulgan‟s first 
criticism that is most relevant to our project now. While it is true that standard resource 
allocation theory assumes that every agent can survive without interacting, this is not nearly as 
fatal a problem for this theory, or for the philosophy that employs economics that relies upon it, 
as one might at first expect. The problem is clearly most acute when dealing with economies 
where indeed many people are either starving or malnourished. These economies have massive 
food shortages, but not necessarily to such an extent that starvation is theoretically unavoidable. 
In fact, there may be enough food to go around if it was distributed more equally, or plausibly, 
even if there were not enough food to go around, there would be enough food if other projects 
were abandoned (perhaps, for example, if one of the few extremely wealthy people, possibly a 
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 Guathier, Morals by Agreement. 
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 Mulgan, The Demands of Consequentialism, 205. 
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 Ibid. 
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 It is worth noting that Mulgan develops this first criticism of Guathier significantly further, Tim Mulgan, Future 
People (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). However, Mulgan relies on problems that Guathier faces because 
of his theory‟s inability to accommodate our obligations to people in the future. The objections that Mulgan utilises 
here are ineffective against using economic assumptions in the context of world poverty now. (See Future People’s 
second chapter, especially pages 24-38.) 
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warlord, who lives in the economy in question, decided not to build yet another private golf 
course for herself, but instead allowed the site to be used to grow grain). 
The problem is the normative position that we have accepted about the situation before 
considering the theory. Clearly it is ethically unacceptable in an ideal world to have people 
starving to death. However, the standard theory of resource allocation should be seen as purely 
descriptive. It assumes that all agents are rational (in the technical economic sense) and that they 
will trade resources only when it directly benefits them. Thus, there may be large amounts of 
resources that could be used to feed the starving people, but they won‟t be used to do that, 
according to the theory, if the people who own those resources are not benefited by that trade. 
Thus in the cases where this occurs, the problem is not the theory of resource allocation, because 
it predicts how resources will be distributed assuming that agents think only of themselves, and 
the amount of resources that one needs to survive is not a component of that allocation. It may be 
the case that the theory is flawed for other reasons, for example because agents are indeed not 
rational in the technical economic sense of the term, but it is not flawed because it predicts that 
in many cases resources shall not be distributed in such a way that everybody can survive, even 
when there are enough of them to accomplish this were they equally divided, because people do 
starve to death. 
Assuming that the standard theory of resource allocation is true
45
, the question then 
becomes what should we do to increase total welfare so people don‟t starve? Thus, we need to 
work within the bounds of economic theory when evaluating what we should do to try to solve 
issues concerning poverty. This illustrates perfectly the proper connection between 
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consequentialism and economics. Consequentialism, in general terms, sets the ethical goal to 
create as much welfare as possible. Economics tells us how to actually do that, given some 
assumptions about how people behave and how the world is. In effect, normative welfare 
economics turns out to be applied consequentialism. Thus it is this approach that I have adopted 
to tackling the issue of poverty. 
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Chapter 2 
Introduction 
Before we begin, it is worth noting that there is a relevant distinction to be made between 
competing conceptions of fair trade. By fair trade, I mean buying goods for more than market 
value (what I am essentially calling a free trade good), with the intention of aiding the producer 
of that good. We might call this positive fair trade. This is by far the ethically stronger position, 
at least in consequentialist moral terms, to its alternative, which I shall call negative fair trade.  
 Negative fair trade is a position where its proponents argue that we should boycott goods 
that are produced in a manner that does not allow the workers who make those goods to live up 
to our (or some set minimum) living standards, and we will discuss how this is effectively setting 
a price floor, and why this too, in general, has serious theoretical problems. As by far the 
stronger philosophical position is what I called positive fair trade above, we will concern 
ourselves far more with it, as opposed to the alternative which we will only briefly look at in 
section 4.3. Thus, we shall concern ourselves with positive fair trade here, and only briefly 
examine negative fair trade later. 
In this chapter we compare free trade to fair trade directly. We will begin in section 2.1 
by considering generally what occurs when an industry is subsidised. I will first argue that 
effectively fair trade is a form of subsidisation, and then we will look at the problems that 
subsidisation generally leads to, regardless of the specific implications. In section 2.2, relying 
heavily on an essay by Yanchus and Vanssay, we shall look at some of the general theoretical 
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problems discussed in 2.1 as directly applied to fair trade and free trade: i.e. we will look at why 
even if many practical problems are assumed away, free trade and a direct transfer of the 
difference in cost between the price of free trade goods and fair trade goods is more beneficial 
than fair trade. In section 2.3 we shall explore this alternative directly and I will argue that we 
should adopt such a policy as it is ethically superior to fair trade. I.e., I will suggest that instead 
of engaging in fair trade, it is better to buy equivalent free trade goods and donate the difference 
in price between those goods to acceptable charities.  
After section 2.3, we shall then begin to move towards more practical arguments that 
demonstrate further reasons to prefer free trade plus a donation to charity rather than fair trade. 
The goal of these sections will be to show that the „aid component‟ of fair trade is less 
„targeted‟46 than alternative forms of aid, and that this means effectively that it is less efficient 
and less desirable than these alternatives. In section 2.4, we will see why this is the case 
employing some basic assumptions about economies of scale. 
In section 2.5, we will consider another problem with fair trade, that of cash crops‟ value 
dramatically fluctuating because of bumper crops being produced both locally and globally. 
Specifically, there is another danger of subsidising particular agricultural products in situations 
where there is poor access to capital, farming technology and practices that would allow for 
farmers to easily change the crops that they grow, and there is also poor access to futures markets 
that would otherwise protect farmers from the sometimes dramatic fluctuations in the prices of 
their cash crops, which are often caused by bumper crops and simply poor planning. 
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 I will define what I mean by the „aid component‟ of a fair trade good and aid „targeting‟ shortly. 
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In section 2.6, we will discuss another practical problem with fair trade: that in practice it 
aids (especially in the coffee industry) the most inefficient producers and thus provides an 
incentive for them to continue to farm and effectively drive down the price of coffee and 
discourage modernisation. This occurs because it reduces the potential profits of an alternative 
industrialised plantation, and this reduced potential slows the process of development down, 
because there is less of an incentive for entrepreneurs to develop these techniques. 
Finally, before moving into the first section of this chapter, I will quickly discuss two 
concepts that I will now define: how I use the term „targeted‟ in the context of aid, and what the 
„aid component‟ of a fair trade good is. Further, I will make explicit an assumption that I do not 
require for any of my arguments, but one that certainly helps my cause significantly if one (as I 
do) accepts it. 
 I shall define targeting  as the extent that aid accomplishes its objective of increasing the 
welfare of the people that it is supposed to help. Thus the more targeted aid is, the more it 
increases the welfare of its intended beneficiaries given the set cost of that aid. What I shall refer 
to as „untargeted‟  aid is aid that performs no better at increasing the welfare of its intended 
beneficiaries than simply directly and randomly giving the people who live in the region an equal 
amount of money that that aid would have effectively cost. Thus, if I had one million pounds of 
aid to help people in an undeveloped region of the world, and I simply went around handing it 
out in equal amounts to whoever I came across, regardless of whether the people I came across 
were warlords or starving to death, until I ran out of the money, then that would be essentially 
untargeted aid.  Any aid that is less targeted than another, is clearly less efficient, and therefore, 
if there is a clear case to be made for why one form of aid is better targeted than another, then I 
shall argue that that form of aid is morally preferable. 
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When somebody buys a fair trade good, I shall assume that that person wants that 
product, and would buy that product for its market price if a fair trade equivalent good was not 
available. Thus any benefit that that good brings to the person who makes it, which is not in 
addition to the benefit that that same person would have received had it been bought for its free 
trade price, should not be considered as aid. However, any benefit that that person receives, in 
addition to the benefit that that person would have received had it been bought for its free trade 
price, is effectively aid, and it is this that I refer to as „the aid component‟ of a fair trade good. 
Essentially, the price of a fair trade good less the cost of an equivalent free trade good is the aid 
component of a fair trade good.  Further, it is only the aid component of a fair trade good that 
should be considered to be targeted, because the benefit that the beneficiary of that aid receives 
in addition to the aid component of the fair trade good is only coincidental to that aid. 
Further, I hope that it is a fair assumption that some form of targeted aid will be more 
effective than the way in which a fair trade good‟s aid component is targeted. Essentially, giving 
the money to an ideal charity that operates in the same area that the beneficiaries live in, will 
help the total population more than giving it to the farmers. This charity could take the form of 
improving basic infrastructure, like providing clean drinking water, or building schools and 
hospitals. Because there is considerable debate about the most effective means to provide aid, I 
will not favour one charity or form of aid over another, simply I assume that there is theoretically 
an ideal charity that is better targeted than the aid component of fair trade and leave determining 
what kind of aid that is to economists as it is an empirical question.
47
 This assumption clearly 
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“Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid,” European Economic Review, 40.2 (1996): 289-329, or Keith Griffin 
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makes my position considerably stronger and is reason to adopt my conclusion about fair trade in 
itself. However, none of my arguments require this assumption in any way, and all of my 
arguments that proceed in this chapter are independent of this assumption. 
2.1 Subsidising Industries 
The first question that we must answer is what is the difference between subsidisation 
and charity and why should fair trade been seen as effectively both. Normally subsidies are 
imposed upon one segment of the population for the benefit of another, but in the case of fair 
trade it is not. In fair trade the first segment is voluntarily paying a higher price for the goods that 
they consume for the benefit of the second group who produce those goods. Because of this, it is 
certainly charity rather than normal subsidisation. 
Since the aid component of fair trade transactions is charity, there is a temptation by its 
proponents to rely on this fact to defend it from economic criticisms. Nichols makes two claims, 
“Firstly, as a consumer choice movement, [fair trade] is outside the scope of government 
regulation and thus cannot be criticised as an interventionist trade policy. Secondly, by 
correcting market failures to make the trading system work for everyone, Fairtrade is, in fact, a 
neo-liberal solution to problems with trade. Fairtrade works within an efficient capitalist system, 
rather than abandoning the liberal trade model entirely.”48 While Nichols first point has some 
merit (the attack he is defending fair trade from is one better directed at what I termed negative 
                                                                                                                                                             
some form of aid that can be effective. Further, other recent studies have found the opposite, that aid actually is 
effective even in non-ideal cases where local governments are corrupt and repressive, for example Henrik Hansen 
and Finn Tarp, “Aid Effectiveness Disputed,” OECD, accessed September 08, 2010, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/46/2664921.pdf. Thus, I assume that there is some ideal form of aid at least 
superior to untargeted aid, though I will leave it undecided as to what that form of aid actually is. 
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 Alex Nicholls, “Thriving in a Hostile Environment: Fairtrade‟s Role as a Positive Market Mechanism for 
Disadvantaged Producers,” FLO, accessed August 29, 2010,  
http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/includes/documents/cm_docs/2008/a/alex_nichols.pdf 9-10.  
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fair trade in the introduction of this chapter, which we shall consider in chapter 4), his second 
point attempts to shield fair trade from too broad a category of criticism. Fair trade is equivalent 
to a form of direct subsidisation and we shall see that it therefore suffers from the same 
inefficiencies that plague such policies when they take their more usual form, that of being 
instituted by a government.  
In neoclassical economic terms, subsidisation is almost always (if not only ever) an act of 
government,
49
 for the purposes of promoting an activity for a host of possible reasons, such as 
trying to break into a higher tech, higher wage industry, or because something culturally 
significant, like small cheese production in France or building and maintaining theatres for 
drama companies. This is effectively accomplished by taxing, or in some other way, charging 
one segment of the population (or possibly the entire population) and redistributing that money 
to a different segment. However, it should be noted that often such policies have very different 
consequences than are intended by the government that imposes them. In a simple direct case, 
subsidisation could take the form of clear cash payments made to members of a certain industry, 
to encourage them, or it could take an indirect form such as a quota system that artificially limits 
the supply of a certain good and raises the price above what the market would normally bear. In 
the first case, all taxpayers would be paying the burden of the subsidy, while in the second only 
the consumers of the goods (who would be forced to pay higher prices for them than they 
otherwise would need to) would pay it entirely themselves. 
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 Thus, fair trade, especially were it to become far more widespread, is economically 
equivalent to subsidisation, and we shall see shortly exactly how subsidisation has distorting 
effects on the market which can have profoundly negative consequences for everybody involved, 
even the people who appear to be directly benefiting from that subsidisation. We shall certainly 
see that even if the subsidisation in question is actually beneficial to the people in the 
undeveloped regions that it is directly targeting, it is certainly not the best means of benefiting 
those people, and that much more could be done with the same money if it were better targeted. 
Let‟s look now at a common theoretical problem of subsidising industries. As we noted 
above, governments can subsidise industries in many ways, and it doesn‟t need to take the form 
of directly paying the industry in question money in order to encourage it to continue to produce 
whatever products or services that it makes or provides. However, while this is the most simple 
case of subsidisation, it is one that is rarely used. Far more frequently governments impose 
policy effectively to subsidise an industry or an activity without directly paying that industry. 
Instead other policies designed to promote or protect that industry are implemented, such as 
instituting price floors or ceilings.  
Let‟s begin by looking at subsidisation in quite general terms, and we shall assume that it 
is taking the form of an industry being supported by directly paying a premium for every good 
that is made or sold. This actually represents quite accurately the effect that fair trade has, 
because fair trade is effectively the direct subsidisation of whatever industry is in question, and it 
works essentially on a per unit basis of whatever item happens to be being sold. 
When a fair trade good, be it a cup of coffee or a chocolate bar, is bought it has the effect 
of subsidising the relevant industry in the developing world where it was produced. The people 
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making it are paid a higher rate for it than they would otherwise receive. This has the effect of 
increasing the amount of those goods that are made, because those goods are more profitable 
than they otherwise would be. As producers naturally move their production into the subsidised 
good, this has the necessary effect of reducing the production of whatever  alternatives they were 
producing before the subsidisation.  
Suppose we graph the production of a developing economy as follows, on the X axis we 
shall put the output of coffee (coffee will be our generic good standing for fair trade goods in 
general) and on the Y access the output of all other goods. Thus, when coffee is subsidised we 
can expect the production to shift down and to the right. 
Figure 1 
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The diagonal line represents every possible production point that is achievable at the 
economy‟s maximum output. Every point above and to the right of the line represents more 
output than the economy can produce, while every point below and to the left is less than 
optimal. Thus when X=0, there is no coffee being produced at all, and the economy is producing 
entirely other goods, and when Y=0, only coffee is being produced.  
A way to illustrate the force which leads to this rebalancing of the goods due to 
subsidisation is to look at the individual good of coffee in terms of its quantity and its price, 
which are respectively the X and Y axis in figure 2. Normally within a market, the price and 
quantity of a good is at (or near) the equilibrium between the supply and demand of that good. 
The quantity of a good produced (the supply) can be seen as equivalent to a function, where the 
higher the price of the good, the more of that good is produced. Similarly the demand for that 
good is a function where the higher the price of the good, the less consumers are inclined to buy 
it. The point where the functions meet is the equilibrium, and it is clear how the competing 
forces of supply and demand will constantly be pushing the good to that price and quantity. If too 
much of the good is produced, a surplus is the result and the producers are forced to lower prices 
to liquidate their stocks of the good, (this lower price results in a disinclination on their part to 
produce that same good compared to how much they would have been prepared to produce, had 
the price remained higher). Similarly, if there is a shortage of the good, consumers are forced to 
pay higher prices to acquire it, and this higher price creates the impetus for producers to make 
more of it than they otherwise would have, had the price remained the same. Thus, prices and 
quantities of goods tend to oscillate around equilibrium, and the further in either direction that 
they move away from equilibrium, the stronger the forces pulling them back towards it become. 
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The benefits of this self regulation should not be underestimated, and we shall return to them 
later in section 3.4. 
Figure 2 
 
When a good is subsidised, like when a fair trade policy is adopted by consumers of a 
good, this provides producers of that good an incentive to make more of it. Thus, as we can see 
on figure 3, the supply curve moves to the right. The Demand curve however remains 
unchanged. This demonstrates why subsidisation results in more coffee being produced. 
Producers will produce more of the same good at the same price. 
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Figure 3 
 
Because more coffee is produced, there must be a decrease in the alternative goods that 
were being made instead of it, as was diagrammed in figure 1. However, there is a reason why 
production settles on a certain point, rather than on any other. 
Consumers are assumed both to prefer a particular blend of goods and more of a good to 
less of it. These preferences can be represented by an indifference curve. This can be put in terms 
of an individual to help appreciate the point. Assuming that a consumer is getting the perfect 
possible balance between a combination of goods, were she to get less of one of those, she would 
need proportionately more of the other good to offset this shift to remain equally happy. Thus, 
assuming that she indeed received proportionally more of the second good, she would remain 
indifferent to either of those two choices (her welfare would remain the same). We can illustrate 
this indifference by returning to graphing coffee and other outputs as we did in figure 1.  On the 
diagram below, the curve Y represents this indifference. Notice however that every point on the 
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curve, except for point X, is above the theoretical line that represents the maximum output of the 
economy. Thus the production of an economy is assumed to be the point where the indifference 
curve that represents the aggregate preferences of the members within that economy is tangent to 
the line that represents the possible output of that economy. 
Figure 4 
 
Another way to think of this is the following. Rational agents make choices and buy 
goods and services in such a way as to maximise their own utility. Suppose the points along the 
indifference curve Y represent equal utility for an agent (rather than for all the agents within an 
economy), but only one can be actually achieved. The rational agent will buy coffee and other 
goods in such a way as to achieve this balance. While considering the aggregate preferences of 
an entire economy is clearly more difficult, and there are certainly some theoretical hurdles to 
overcome, in principle we can see how the preferences of a group can be represented in the same 
way. 
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However, subsidising one of the goods alters the balance of those goods that can be 
acquired. It has the effect (assuming other factors remain equal), as we have seen in figure 3, of 
both increasing the quantity produced as well as reducing the price of that good, in our case 
coffee, and therefore necessarily reducing the production and increasing the price of every other 
good within an economy, and given that the economy was already assumed to be at maximum 
capacity, it will be impossible to produce more of those goods to offset this shift. Thus it is now 
impossible for consumers to acquire the optimal balance of those goods: they are forced to 
acquire an alternative of more coffee and proportionally less other goods. We see below that the 
production point after subsidisation is thus equivalent to point X1 on indifference curve Y1, even 
though X1 is below the diagonal line that represents the maximum output of the economy. I.E., 
by subsidising coffee, the result is equivalent to lowering the total output of the economy, in 
terms of the utility that it generates, for the people that participate within it.  
Figure 5 
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2.2 Specific Theoretical Costs of Fair Trade 
In “The Myth of Fair Prices: A Graphical Analysis”50 Yanchus and Vanssay break the 
costs of fair trade into three components for the rest of the world and two internal components 
for the target of the aid. The first cost to the rest of the world is simply the increase from the 
market price to the fair trade cost that the consumers in the developed world pay.
51
 However, in 
our case we are ignoring this theoretical cost, because we will be comparing fair trade not to free 
trade directly, but to free trade plus a donation, to an acceptable charity, of the difference in 
price, that the consumer in question would make, between free and fair trade goods. Thus, while 
this is a cost, it is an equal cost to the alternative that we are considering and we should rightfully 
not count it as such in this case. The second cost to the rest of the world is another cost that is 
borne by the developed world. This is the cost to consumers as a whole in the developed world 
who receive less other goods than they would otherwise because of the incentive that fair trade 
offers farmers to make coffee, cocoa or any other fair trade good.
52
 
This second cost can be explained as follows. Assuming that consumers in the developed 
world are rational, they normally buy the combination of goods that maximises their utility from 
the developed world (this is because, by being rational, they buy the combination of goods that 
maximises their utility in all cases). Thus, assuming that producers in the developing world are 
rational as well, they provide as close to this optimal combination as possible, because this 
maximises the return on those goods that they are able to charge. When consumers in the 
developed world, therefore, buy fair trade goods, one of the costs to the developed world is the 
loss of utility that arises when the developing world shifts production away from other non 
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targeted goods, for those other goods instead. Recall the previous section that demonstrates why 
this shift occurs. Producers of fair trade goods are artificially having those goods made more 
profitable for them, which causes them to make more of them and less of the now less profitable 
goods that they would have been making instead. Consumers of those other goods are thus 
unable to buy them and are consequently less well off than they would be otherwise.  
While theoretically a cost, this second cost has to be admitted to be a rather insignificant 
one, especially as the goal of fair trade is to help far worse off people than the other consumers in 
the developing world who are theoretically harmed by such a policy, and given the 
consequentialist normative approach to ethics that I employ, I have to be wary of employing such 
an argument. Thus, I am only able to use this cost in an argument against fair trade, because 
adopting a policy of fair trade is, in this case, at the expense of an alternative policy that helps 
the developing world as much or more than fair trade does already, while not harming the 
developed world‟s consumers in this way. 
The third cost is to other producers of the fair trade good who are not targeted (or 
subsidised) by the fair trade itself, and this cost is especially acute in coffee, because coffee is an 
inelastic good.
53
 As we have seen above, when an industry is subsidised, this tends to increase 
the supply of the good above where it would be at its natural equilibrium point. Because farmers 
who are the beneficiaries of fair trade make more money than they otherwise would, they 
produce extra coffee or whatever other good is being subsidised. This creates a surplus, and 
lowers the price for coffee in general. Further, according to Yanchus and Vanssay, coffee is the 
sort of good that people tend not to want especially higher amounts of once they have enough of 
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it: it is inelastic.
54
  This means that as the farmers who benefit from fair trade produce more 
goods because of the subsidisation by consumers in the developed world, farmers everywhere 
else are especially harmed as they are forced to reduce their production as the price of coffee 
dramatically falls as a result of the extra production caused by fair trade. These nontargeted 
farmers are clearly harmed by fair trade policy. Further, these farmers are likely not significantly 
better off than the beneficiaries of the fair trade, given where most of the coffee in the world is 
made, as well as who makes it. 
Citing Ruffin and Jones,
55
 Yanchus and Vanssay‟s  first internal cost of fair trade 
subsidisation is essentially the mirror of the second external effect. As coffee is subsidised, the 
producers of other goods within the economy that is targeted are put at a disadvantage because 
they have a harder time competing for any common resources. Thus, if a banana plantation is 
nearby a fair trade coffee plantation, and there is a limited amount of water, fertiliser, and 
electricity that both plantations need, then the coffee producer will be able to outbid the banana 
grower more easily for these resources, if he is being subsidised.
56
 Further, nontargeted growers 
of coffee in other countries are disadvantaged for the same reason: the price of coffee is reduced, 
and they then have a harder time competing with the banana growers in that country. Finally, the 
last cost is hardest to quantify, but Yanchus and Vanssay claim it could be the most damaging. 
“Because fair prices distort information about a country‟s long-term competitive advantage, fair 
pricing may lead a developing economy down a dangerous path of dependence on the premiums 
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from fair prices. This internal distortion as well as the internal distortions in nontargeted 
countries may yet induce the highest costs from fair pricing.”57   
The following diagram represents some of these costs. I have replicated it from how it 
appears originally in their essay, except that I have changed the labels of some of points. We can 
see that the first cost to the developed world is the movement from U to T. The second is the 
movement from U to V, and thus the total cost is V to T. 
Figure 6  
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2.3 An Alternative to Fair Trade 
Let‟s begin by considering two alternatives. First, one simply buys a fair trade good (such 
as a chocolate bar or a cup of coffee)  and benefits people in a developing economy by however 
much the fair trade‟s aid component actually helps them, plus however much benefit they receive 
from selling their goods for the actual market price of those goods, or secondly by buying an 
equivalent free trade good and donating the difference to whatever charity one likes. I will argue 
that it is this second alternative that we should favour. I shall argue for this position in the 
following sections by presenting practical problems that are specific to fair trade that are not 
concerns for the alternative approach of buying free trade goods and then donating the difference 
in price to appropriate charities. First, however, I will make clear the theoretical gains of such an 
approach that are argued for by Yanchus and Vanssay, assuming that the aid is untargeted as I 
have defined it. 
Recalling figure 6 in the previous section, the loss represented by the move from V to T, 
which is the cost to consumers in the developed world having the price of the commodities 
distorted by fair trade, is eliminated, and thus the same amount of good is accomplished for a 
lower cost. Further, by not distorting the price of coffee, the developed world is benefited by 
more than fair trade, which is represented by the move from the point on indifference curve Y1, 
which represents consumption after subsidisation, to the point in the middle of the indifference 
curve Y2, which represents consumption before the subsidising effect of fair trade.
58
  For these 
reasons, assuming that there are no additional costs by running a charity rather than the 
additional costs incurred by guaranteeing that the aid component of a fair trade transaction is 
being properly spent, clearly fair trade is, theoretically at least, unreasonably inefficient. A 
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straight donation, to a charity that uses the money in an equally targeted fashion as the aid 
component of fair trade does, of the equivalent of the aid component of a fair trade good would 
produce better results for both the consumers and the general population of that good‟s 
producers. Assuming that there is a form of further targeted aid beyond that of the aid component 
of a fair trade transaction, strengthens this point even more. 
The problem that fair trade has is essentially one of targeting. We have good reason to 
believe that the aid component of any fair trade transaction is more poorly targeted than it could 
be. First of all, while there are many disputes about the effectiveness of different sorts of aid, it is 
quite plausible that some form of planned aid must be better targeted than giving money directly 
to a small (fairly arbitrary) subset of a population. Thus, while one might think that Oxfam, for 
example, is a wasteful or otherwise ineffective charity, it is quite likely that some form of aid 
that directly targets certain social ills, like a lack of clean drinking water, and devotes an equal 
amount of money to those ills, rather than directly paying a minority of people in the region a 
premium for their goods, will better aid that region than a straight donation to arbitrary members 
of the region‟s population.  
Further, even if we do away with the assumption that there is theoretically an approach to 
targeting aid that is more effective than simply directly transferring funds to undeveloped regions 
of the world, there are good reasons to favour an alternative means of targeting the aid 
component of a fair trade transaction beyond the theoretical ones discussed above. These reasons 
are practical problems that are costs that fair trade goods have that either a direct donation 
(untargeted aid) or a donation to a charity that focuses on either alleviating certain ills, or 
building certain public goods does not. They are the topics of the following sections of this 
chapter. 
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Finally, before continuing, it is worth admitting that fair trade makes up a very small part 
of the market. Martin Wolf writes in 2004 that it is less than 1% of the market for cocoa, coffee, 
and tea, and it is virtually nonexistent in other cases such as palm and coconut oil.
59
  However 
fair trade is definitely becoming more prevalent, and assuming that it indeed does becomes 
common, the problems outlined in the following sections give us clear reason to prefer 
alternatives to it. Further, using the fact that fair trade is such a small part of the market to defend 
it from these criticisms is rather disingenuous on the part of its proponents: it is dubious to 
suggest that fair trade should be supported, but only to the extent that it really doesn‟t catch on. 
Clearly, we should assume that indeed proponents of fair trade are recommending its adoption on 
a large scale, especially since so long as it remains small, it is not truly a solution to world 
poverty. 
2.4 Economies of Scale 
The first problem is the cost of a lack of economies of scale. When comparing large free 
trade operations versus smaller fair trade operations, one of the most striking differences is the 
efficiencies that the former realise over the latter due to their substantial size. In this section, I 
will argue not that we should promote free trade goods because of this efficiency, (which will be 
covered in section 3.3, but because fair trade loses this efficiency when aid is funnelled through 
it as a mechanism, i.e. a portion of a donation made through fair trade is lost compared to making 
it through the alternative that I am recommending, because the economies of scale efficiencies 
that are present in free trade goods are lost in fair trade. 
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Suppose I am considering buying a cup of coffee made from beans that were supplied by 
Nestlé, or suppose I am considering buying a chocolate bar from a corner store made by Nestlé
60
 
as opposed to a fair trade equivalent. Two major forces are at work driving down the price of 
those goods: first fierce competition with other free trade companies.
61
  Secondly, Nestlé utilises 
economies of scale considerably to decrease its costs compared to other smaller but otherwise 
similar companies.
62
 The first benefit we are removing from the equation, because whatever 
price Nestlé pays for the cocoa or coffee beans is what we are assuming is the market price, and 
we are only comparing the aid component of fair trade goods, because we are assuming that the 
people who benefit from the aid component of a fair trade good are indeed the people who are 
producing it, and it is those people who Nestlé is paying for the coffee or cocoa in question. 
However, the second „economy of scale savings‟ that Nestlé enjoys, part of which it passes on to 
its customers to make itself at least as competitive, if not more competitive, than its competitors, 
is lost in the fair trade transaction. For the sake of argument, let‟s assume that the economies of 
scale savings that Nestlé benefits from, compared to its fair trade competitors, which it passes 
onto the consumer, is 20p per cup of coffee sold, and this directly comes off the price of the cup 
of coffee.
63
 It is this that is being lost from the fair trade equation. 
Let‟s add some more hypothetical numbers to the example. Suppose the free trade cup of 
coffee costs £1, and a fair trade one costs £2. The producers of the coffee beans receive 1 pound 
                                                 
60
 Nestle here is taken to be equivalent to any multinational corporation that heavily utilizes free trade goods. 
61
 It is of course this competition that forces Nestle to exert all of its bargaining power to demand the lowest possible 
prices from its suppliers, which is what opponents of free trade generally object to. 
62
 The benefits of being a large company are many; they include, for example, better access to capital, securable by 
issuing bonds and shares on stock markets for instance, by shipping goods in larger more cost effective quantities, 
by streamlining management (employing less managers per tonne of coffee sold etc.), having the ability to operating 
on tighter profit margins while continuing to make the same profit, and many others. Thus, I take it for granted that 
this is an advantage that is realised by larger free trade companies over their smaller fair trade competitors. 
63
 I am assuming that we are buying the cup of coffee from Nestle and its fair trade equivalent directly, because 
adding a retail store into the example merely complicates it unnecessarily. 
 The Ethics of Globalisation, Free Trade and Fair Trade  70 
less the costs that Nestlé incurs on the coffee above the cost of the coffee itself, (C)  as well as 
the profits that it makes (P), and this is what we are assuming is the market price of the coffee 
beans in both cases, i.e. the market price that the producers receive is £1 - (C + P), and we shall 
assume that this is 5p. The additional premium pound that the fair trade cup of coffee costs to 
buy is the aid component of the fair trade good. If we buy a free trade cup of coffee for 1 pound 
and donate the difference in cost between it and an equivalent fair trade good to the charity of 
our choice, who we shall assume gives the money to the people growing the coffee beans (and 
we shall continue to assume that they do it no more or less efficiently than had it been given to 
them through the fair trade targeting mechanism), then they receive £1.05 (5p from Nestlé and 
£1 from the charity) per cup of coffee. 
However, suppose that we buy instead a fair trade cup of coffee for 2 pounds and do 
nothing more. The fair trade company does not operate nearly as efficiently as Nestlé, because of 
the economy of scale factors considered above. Thus the producers of the coffee beans receive 
less than £1.05. This is because the costs plus profit of the fair trade company are higher than 
Nestlé‟s. The beneficiaries of the aid component of the fair trade transaction receive £2 minus 
the costs plus profits of the fair trade company, which is 95p plus the 20p that Nestlé passes onto 
its customers, which it receives from the benefit of the economies of scale advantage that it 
receives. Thus, the producers receive £2 -(C + P +20p) which equals 85p. 
This results in clearly less targeted aid, with more of the money that is supposed to help 
people in the developing part of the world being wasted on non aid related costs, than if we were 
to buy free trade goods and donate the difference to acceptable charities that aim to support the 
same people that fair trade goods aim to. When we buy free trade goods and donate the 
difference in price between them and fair trade goods to charities, we are able to increase the 
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effectiveness of our donations by the savings that free trade companies enjoy due to their more 
efficient sizes. 
2.5 Bumper Crops 
A well documented hurdle that undeveloped and developing countries face is the damage 
that can be created by bumper crops. Developing and undeveloped countries tend to have large 
portions of their industry focusing on few cash crops, and when these crops have strong growing 
seasons, their value is reduced significantly due to the large surplus that is often the result. This 
is especially a worry for producers of coffee and other goods where there is a lag between the 
changes of prices and the corrections to the quantities produced that are a result of these changes.  
Coffee plants take several years to grow to the point where they can be harvested. So if 
the price of coffee increases, the farmers who plant additional crops to take advantage of the 
increase will not be able to reap the rewards until years later, and if at which point the prices 
have since dropped, the rewards can cruelly turn into paucities.
64
 Unfortunately this is a 
possibility especially if the reason for the increase in price was not due to the long term prospects 
of the industry but because of an anomaly within the market, like a heavy frost and drought both 
occurring in a major coffee producing region during a short time span, as happened in Brazil 
during the mid 1990s.
65
 Just as farmers experience a lag to increase production in response to 
price increases, they can find themselves lagging to shift away from a crop even after the price 
has shifted down unfavourably. “Supply is stubbornly slow to adjust downward during periods of 
overcapacity. Because fixed costs (i.e., the costs of growing and maintaining trees) are a high 
share of the total costs of coffee production, it is economically rational for farmers to continue to 
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harvest coffee beans as long as prices cover variable costs, even if prices are well below average 
total costs.”66 In the next chapter, section 3.4 we will examine how globalisation, specifically 
larger more sophisticated growers and access to futures markets, helps mitigate the damage 
created by bumper crops. 
The problem of bumper crops is often cited by fair trade organisations as one of the 
reasons why fair trade is beneficial.
67
 However, ironically, fair trade itself exacerbates this 
problem. Fair trade increases the incentive that growers have for producing these cash crops and 
hence it increases the relative size of these crops in their respective countries‟ economies. 
Further, as we shall discus in more depth in the following section, fair trade specifically targets 
small non-industrialised  producers, and it is of course these producers who are the most likely to 
be the least sensitive to price volatility, because they have the least information about coffee 
production in far off regions of the world. Clearly, therefore, aid that does not have the effect of 
increasing production in a cash crop that suffers chronically from price volatility will be better 
targeted than the aid component of a fair trade transaction, assuming that all other factors are 
equal. 
2.6 Sustainability 
We will consider one final practical problem with fair trade compared to free trade. A 
substantial emphasis is put upon „sustainable‟ production by fair trade proponents and 
organisations, for example by the Fair Trade Labelling Organizations International (FLO)
68
 and 
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the World Fair Trade Orginazation (WFTO).
69
  While in principle nobody disputes that 
„sustainable‟ production is a good thing, the implementation of such policy can have devastating 
consequences, which can slow the growth of developing countries‟ economies. Fair trade 
promotes small operations with little use of modern industrialised (especially within agriculture) 
technologies such as using synthetic fertiliser and energy intense techniques, because of its focus 
on sustainability, rather than larger industrialised operations which it views as less sustainable.
70
  
Further, it promotes small operations in general and their continued long term existence, in a 
recent impact study commissioned by Max Havelaar France, a member of the FLO, for example, 
this is explicitly listed as an achievement of fair trade.
 71
 
An example of this is the FLO‟s policy to continue to bar large scale coffee plantations 
from acquiring fair trade accreditation. And by large scale, it means anything but the smallest of 
operations, which it defines as not requiring hired workers or anything other than manual 
labour,
72
 i.e. it does not allow its members to industrialise, and it directly subsidises the 
inefficient competition of the industrialised producers that already exist or are considering 
entering the market. This clearly has the effect of creating a disincentive for coffee producers to 
industrialise in the developing world.  The justification for this policy is that “The global 
Fairtrade coffee market is still too small to support both small farmers and plantations: currently 
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less than half the total production volume of Fairtrade certified farmers‟ groups is sold on 
Fairtrade terms because worldwide demand is too small to absorb it all.”73  
However, development occurs by taking advantage of superior technology and practices. 
It is simply impossible to have a developed economy that has large amounts of its labour force 
all producing small amounts of coffee for sale on international markets, especially when there 
are other regions in the world already industrialised or in the process of industrialising that 
directly compete in that market, e.g. Brazil and Vietnam.
74
 Further, another way in which 
agricultural industry is made sustainable, ignored by the FLO, is the ability of that industry to 
shift production away from price volatile commodities, such as coffee, and be able to diversify 
its production.  Much of the industrialised equipment that the FLO is denying these small coffee 
producers can be used in a host of other agricultural activities, and this could allow them more 
easily to shift their production away from the single price volatile commodity of coffee, and into 
a diversity of crops far better protected from the boom and bust cycles that plague particularly 
the coffee industry. 
The wealth that we enjoy in developed countries is accomplished through having large 
amounts of our labour force freed from agricultural duty. This allows many of us to be 
productive in other industries (people who used to need to farm to sustain themselves are able to 
become pilots and plumbers etc., which is what makes those services possible) and the products 
and services that are produced because of this is what generates what we think of as the wealth 
that we enjoy and the undeveloped world lacks, hence industrialisation (especially of agriculture) 
is an essential component of globalisation.  Subsidising only small coffee operations can slow 
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this process down, and while it benefits the farmers directly, it would benefit the developing 
countries on the whole far more, if fair trade did not subsidise an activity that directly hampers 
these regions‟ economic development into an industrialised economy. 
We can understand this problem further if we consider the following example. Suppose I 
were to offer the following deal to a farmer in a developed region of the world: I would pay her 
an additional premium on all the grain she grows, but she would have to grow it entirely on a 
small scale and not use many modern farming techniques, including industrialised equipment. 
Further, she would only be allowed to hire a very few additional workers to help her, though this 
stipulation is not really necessary, as she would not be able to afford to pay them competitive 
wages anyways. Unless I paid her many thousands of pounds in premiums, she would obviously 
never accept this arrangement. This is because to farm successfully in the developed countries of 
the world requires competing with other farmers who produce many tonnes of grain at extremely 
little cost. Any farmer in the developed world who accepted the conditions that the FLO imposes 
on coffee farmers in developing countries would live an appalling life style by developed country 
standards. 
However, the living standards of people in the undeveloped regions of the world  are 
often extremely poor. This means that if I were to offer many people in undeveloped and 
developing countries this same deal, they would be far more likely to take it, because it might 
very well lead to an increase in their living conditions. However, it has the effect of flooding the 
market with far more of these subsidised goods than would normally be in it, and this drastically 
reduces the incentive for other farmers to improve their farming techniques with the use of 
industrial equipment and fertilisers, because the reward for such an investment is greatly 
diminished. Many others, perhaps some of the few who actually have the capital to buy the 
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necessary equipment, would never enter into the market in the first place, instead focusing on 
another activity that, were it not for the fair trade movement deflating the price of coffee, would 
otherwise be less profitable for them. 
Conclusion 
Clearly, fair trade is inefficient. As we have seen, theoretically it is equivalent to 
subsidisation, and this makes it vulnerable to well understood inefficiencies documented by 
economists. Further, it has a host of practical problems: it loses the benefit realised by large 
companies due to economies of scale, it encourages specialisation rather than diversification, 
and, perhaps worst of all, it hampers globalisation and development because it creates 
disincentives to industrialise, which we shall shortly see is a crucial step in ending world 
poverty.  If we want to help alleviate poverty, then we should find other ways to do so rather 
than relying on fair trade goods. Consumers in the developed world should, rather than seeking 
out fair trade goods, buy free trade goods and either begin to donate to suitable charities or 
increase the amount that they are already donating to these charities by more to reflect the 
savings that they achieve by buying free trade goods instead of fair trade goods. 
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Chapter 3 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will argue for why globalisation should be supported. I will argue first 
that it should be supported regardless of whether there is a possible alternative that is better than 
globalisation at achieving the goal of developing the poorest regions of the world, especially 
Africa, given crucially two empirical assumptions. This is what I call the Plan B and A+ 
argument that is the subject of the first section. Following that section I move to how 
globalisation helps the poor by explaining how both halves of globalisation, as I have defined it 
in section 1.3, help reduce poverty. This will be done by briefly considering the theoretical 
benefits of globalisation using standard economic theory and by citing limited empirical data to 
support the point. Essentially the goal of this will be to justify the two assumptions made in the 
Plan B and A+ argument. 
The first section is the Plan A+ and B argument. The second section argues that growth is 
essential in poverty reduction and that it should be our focus, also section 3.2 further 
distinguishes the problem of poverty and inequality. The third section outlines the benefits of the 
first half of globalisation, the implementation of market economies and industrialisation 
internally within the developing world‟s economies. The fourth section discusses the benefits of 
the second half of globalisation: free trade. 
Crucially, I want to make clear that I harbour no illusions about what globalisation 
entails. I don‟t wish to hide behind euphemisms in this debate: there is no doubt that, especially 
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in the early going, globalisation will manifest itself in the form of sweatshops that have poor (in 
many cases brutal) working conditions. So not only will we discuss how industrialisation in 
principle is good, we shall also discuss how sweatshops as the first stage of development are 
themselves good, even though they are only a stepping stone on the journey and by no means the 
goal in themselves. Further, when people oppose sweatshops they do so only by adopting 
extreme paternalism that can only be sustained by refusing to accept that the people who are 
working in those sweatshops are not behaving rationally. However, this side of the debate will 
have to wait until section 4.1 and 4.4. 
3.1 Plan B and A+ 
It appears as if one of the, if not the, most important questions that has to be answered is 
whether or not development is possible without an intermediary stage of poor working 
conditions. Specifically, can we develop the poorest regions of the world without having to have 
people working in sweat shops? My answer to this question is probably not, and I will attempt to 
explain better my reasons for this position in the following chapter in section 4.4, where we 
consider a prevalent, but false, Marxist intuition that pervades much of the development debate. 
Further, as I will argue shortly, even if it can be done, we shouldn‟t attempt it, because 
globalisation is a force for good, and including it therefore in any plan to develop the world‟s 
poorest regions should be only seen as a good thing. Thus, I shall attempt to put this crucial 
question aside. I hope to do this with a simple proof by cases argument, which I call „the plan B 
and the Plan A+ argument‟. The argument itself can be summarised as follows: 
1) Globalisation is overall a force for good, but it has some perceived negative elements; e.g., 
sweatshops with abhorrent working conditions, especially in the early stages of a poor region‟s 
development, will be prevalent and directly a result of globalisation. (Plan B) 
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2) There may be in principle an alternative way to develop poor regions of the world without 
relying on globalisation, and hence avoid the perceived negative consequences that result 
because of it, and this would be a better way to develop a region than simply relying on 
globalisation. (Plan A) 
3) However, so long as that alternative (plan A) is not being implemented, then plan B is 
preferable to doing nothing at all. 
4) Plan A is either happening or it is not. (Tautology) 
5) Further, given that globalisation is overall a force for good, and plan A can be improved by 
the inclusion of globalisation within it,
 
then globalisation should be a part of it.
 75
 (Plan A+) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
6) We should support globalisation. 
 
The preceding argument is not without controversy. This controversy can be broken 
down into two categories of claims: first, questions of fact (bold), and secondly statements 
relying upon normative positions justified by certain normative theories (italics). Let‟s begin by 
simply noting the factual claims. First, „globalisation is overall a force for good.‟ Secondly, 
„plan A can be improved by the inclusion of globalisation within it.‟ Showing these two 
claims to be the case will be a primary concern of the following sections of this chapter. 
How I attempt to justify my two empirical statements needs to be explained. We shall see 
that globalisation is actually the driving force of development, and that aid should properly be 
seen as in addition to it rather than the other way around (what might really be better thought of 
as B+ rather than A+ as I stated it in the argument above). However, the distinction between B+ 
and A+ as I envision them is quite fleeting. It is really a matter of priority, so in practical terms it 
is a distinction without a difference. Thus my position is that a significant portion of plan A is 
harmful. By prohibiting, or attempting to discourage, sweatshops we slow down globalisation 
                                                 
75
 It must be admitted that many proponents of the plan A policy would deny that the workers who were expelled 
from their sweatshops would be harmed by such a policy, even if we were not also including the significantly more 
aid in the proposal as well, but we will look at why this claim is false in section 3.3 and 4.1. 
 The Ethics of Globalisation, Free Trade and Fair Trade  80 
and hinder development thereby hurting the people in the developing and undeveloped world. It 
may be possible to overcome this harm by conjoining with this policy against sweatshops so 
much aid as to create more good than allowing globalisation to take its normal course would 
create, and it is this that I call plan A.
76
 However, this is inefficient (if even possible at all), so 
ideally we would support globalisation and include the aid that came with plan A, and this is 
effectively both plan A+ or B+, depending on how one looks at it.
77
 Thus, as I see it we have 
three possible courses of action: first plan B, which is to allow globalisation to happen 
unhampered and without aid, which I shall argue would be a good thing (if not the best way to 
solve the problem of poverty), secondly, we could impede globalisation and attempt to develop 
the poor regions of the world through another means, which I have called plan A (this would 
clearly be at considerable cost), or thirdly, (what effectively could be called either plan A+ or 
B+) we could support globalisation, and use the resources that would be required to make plan A 
possible to supplement the development created by globalisation, which is the solution that I 
favour. 
Thus I take it that what I must show are two things that will lead to the two empirical 
claims that my argument at the beginning of this section relies upon: first, globalisation leads to 
development, which entails that it is a force for good, and secondly that discouraging sweatshops 
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and free trade in plan A is less beneficial than not doing so, so plan A would be improved by 
globalisation. 
The normative claims are as follows: first from premise 3, „so long as that alternative 
(plan A) is not being implemented, then plan B is preferable to doing nothing at all’ and 
secondly from premise 5, „given that globalisation is overall a force for good, and plan A can 
be improved by the inclusion of globalisation within it,
 
then globalisation should be a part of 
it.‟ These claims are justified with the two central normative claims discussed in section 1.1: first 
the weak consequentialist principle, we should maximise the good, provided that it doesn’t 
violate other ethical restrictions, and secondly the limited principle of beneficence: we should 
take action to help others that are greatly in need, if we have it within our reasonable power to 
do so, even if we have no significant relations with those people and owe no other obligations to 
them.
78
 
Premise 3 only requires the limited principle of beneficence, because if one is taking no 
action, while others are suffering, and one has the ability to take an action without (or with a 
reasonable) cost, then one should do so, assuming of course that one doesn‟t take an adequate 
alternative action (possibly with a higher cost) to help those people, and in the case of supporting 
globalisation the cost is extremely minimal: simply one has to refrain from actively resisting it, 
such as by boycotting free trade goods and supporting protectionist trade policies. Further, as the 
limited principle of beneficence is a consequence of the weak consequentialist principle, if we 
are prepared to accept either principle, then premise 3 is justified. 
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 Further, there is an argument to be made that premise 5 is justified by the beneficence 
principle as well as by the weak consequentialist principle, because supposing that we are 
performing plan A, then supporting globalisation, by which I mean simply buying free trade 
goods in this case, is clearly within our reasonable power to do. However, many opponents of 
consequentialism, Kantians for example, may look upon such a principle as sneaking 
consequentialism in through the back door, and may be hesitant to accept it,
79
 and of course if 
they are not prepared to accept that argument relying purely on the principle of beneficence, then 
it is unlikely that they would be prepared to accept the weak consequentialist principle as well. 
However, clearly, the weak consequentialist principle produces all the justification that we 
require and should one accept it, then premise 5 is guaranteed. 
Thus, given the weak consequentialist position, the argument is valid. For the sake of 
interest it is worth noting that given the principle of beneficence only, and granting that it does 
not justify premise 5, the argument can still be saved to a large extent, but  it has to be modified 
slightly. Premise 4 and 5 can be replaced by the following claim: „plan A is actually not possible, 
because people are not prepared to demand that such policy is implemented, because doing so 
requires a significant sacrifice on their part.‟ Thus, even if one is prepared to act as morally as 
possible, and assuming even that this includes donating as much as possible to charity and 
reducing one‟s own life to poverty in an effort to save the people starving to death in the 
undeveloped world, then the conclusion can still be saved, and one can still endorse 
globalisation, because now effectively no adequate action is being taken to abate the starvation 
and poverty in the world.  
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1) Globalisation is overall a force for good, but it has some negative elements; e.g., 
sweatshops with abhorrent working conditions, especially in the early stages of a poor 
region‟s development, will be prevalent and directly a result of globalisation. (Plan B) 
2) There may be in principle an alternative way to develop poor regions of the world 
without relying on globalisation, and hence avoid the negative consequences that result 
because of it, and this would be a better way to develop a region than simply relying on 
globalisation. (Plan A) 
3) However, so long as that alternative (plan A) is not being implemented, then plan B is 
preferable to doing nothing at all. 
4) Plan A is not practically possible, because we know others are not going to make the 
necessary sacrifices to implement such a plan. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5) We should support globalisation. 
 
Perhaps, in this case there is also an additional possible Plan B+ that a Kantian should be 
advocating: we should promote globalisation as the best available option, only because others are 
not living up to their moral obligations, and we should supplement globalisation as much as 
possible through donating to appropriate charities.  
Further, if we are prepared to accept that plan A is not actually possible, as 
consequentialists we also should support a B+ plan: i.e., support globalisation but also donate to 
charity (to whatever degree of demandingness one is prepared to accept). This argument 
effectively echoes Peter Singer‟s argument in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” and The Life 
You Can Save with the empirical claim that globalisation is crucially the best means of 
development assumed as well. A move that Singer himself is at least not completely 
unsympathetic towards , as he argues strongly against tariffs and agricultural subsidies in The 
Life You Can Save.
80
 However, in the interest of brevity, we shall leave plan B+ aside in this case 
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and simplify the conclusion to we should support globalisation, as I take it as noncontroversial 
that donating to appropriate charities is a good thing to do. 
Thus let us now turn our attention towards the two crucial empirical claims from my 
above argument. Globalisation is a force for good and secondly an attempt to solve poverty 
without globalisation would do more good with its inclusion. 
3.2 Growth and Inequality 
In section 1.3 we defined poverty and development, and crucially we did it in absolute 
terms, so that we could separate the problem of inequality from poverty. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, policies that are designed to tackle inequality and proscribe harsh working 
conditions often hurt everybody involved, especially the people that they are supposed to help, so 
the first most crucial thing that we have to realise is that by far the best way to raise the living 
standards of the poor is through economic growth. We have already noted that economies can 
grow and the relative share of the benefit of that growth can favour the rich instead of the poor, 
yet so long as the poor‟s welfare increases, then the objective of alleviating poverty is being 
accomplished, even if the objective of reducing inequality is not. 
In simplistic terms poverty and inequality can be seen by graphing it as follows. On the X 
axis we have laid out everybody from richest to poorest, and on the Y axis we have the wealth of 
those people. 
Figure 6 
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Philosophers such as Singer
81
 and Unger
82
 argue that we should take steps to adjust the 
situation so that it looks something more like figure 7. Clearly, they couch the issue as one of 
poverty, but their solution is one primarily of redistribution, and it could, therefore, as well be 
inequality. They might argue, in Unger‟s case especially, that there may be no limit to the extent 
that we should be obligated to strive to create equality through the more fortunate continuously 
donating their wealth to the less fortunate. However, the extent that we should strive for equality 
is essentially a question of demandingness, that we have already covered, and I leave it up to the 
reader to determine to what extent she feels obligated to help the poor through personally 
sacrificing her own wealth. 
Figure 7 
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Unger‟s and Singer‟s position is intuitively aided because were we to distribute the 
population by continent (starting by the wealthiest and ending with the poorest) rather than by 
wealth, we would certainly be struck by how closely the two graphs would resemble each other. 
However, in terms of their position, this fact is actually irrelevant. The distribution of the poor, 
were it to change so that it was more evenly distributed across the world, would not change the 
conclusions of Singer‟s and Unger‟s arguments. 
Yet it is intuitively important that inequality does correlate with region. Thus, ideally, we 
would have an account that makes this fact relevant. The approach that I favour clearly 
distinguishes the problem of equality and poverty, and while it admits that inequality is not 
desirable, I suggest that when tackling the problem of poverty the focus should be far more on 
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the percentage of the population above or below the theoretical line which I have labelled 
poverty, rather than the steepness of the distribution of wealth throughout the population. 
There is a prominent debate in philosophy between prioritarians and egalitarians. Clearly 
my position falls on the side of priority, and that it is certainly where my sympathies lie. 
However, as always I hope to remain as neutral as possible. Thus, my position of prioritarianism 
can be softened so many more egalitarian inclined readers would accept it. Clearly put, all we 
must accept is that when the deprivation of the poorest people is so desperate that they are 
starving to death, raising their living standards at the cost of creating more inequality (i.e., if the 
method that we use to raise their living standards coincidently increases inequality) is plausibly a 
good thing. For example, this stipulation is consistent with Rawls‟ principle of maximin.83 
 Thus, the fact that certain continents have considerably less wealth per person in them is 
made crucial to solving the problem of poverty by my approach, and it does not lead us, when 
considering only poverty, to the conclusion that we need to redistribute wealth to solve the 
problem (something that is a lot more easily said than done, as it is hard to convince people 
living in a liberal democracy to adopt such a policy). Instead we should discover what is 
happening in the wealthy continents that allows the people living on them to be so wealthy, and 
then how we can get the poor continents to be more similar, in that crucial regard, to the wealthy 
ones.  
Thus my position is one where the focus is on economic growth rather than wealth 
transfer. To the extent that we also donate our  personal fortunes to the cause, so much the better, 
but the true solution to the problem has to be growth. Thus, clearly the objective is development: 
                                                 
83
 For further debate of this issue, see Rawls, Chapter 2;  Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, Chapter 2; 
Paul Weirich, “Utility Tempered with Equality,” Nous, 17 (1983): 423-39, Derek Parfit, “Equality and Priority,” 
Ratio, 10, (1997): 202-21, and Joshua Cohen, “Democratic Equality,” Ethics, 99 (1989): 727-51. 
 The Ethics of Globalisation, Free Trade and Fair Trade  88 
to have the people living in the poorest regions of the world able to produce enough goods and 
services that they can create life styles that bring them similar amounts of welfare as the people 
living in the developed world enjoy, and this has to be accomplished by the adoption of the 
practices and technology that allows the developed countries to produce such large amounts of 
goods and services. But there are short term problems that many critics of globalisation point to 
that give them pause to recommend policy to encourage this growth, so we shall now attempt to 
address some of these concerns. 
A common objection to globalisation is that  it is usually the poor in developing 
economies who are the last to benefit from growth, and because of the confusion of seeing 
poverty as relative rather than absolute, it can even be viewed as a negative and not a positive. 
We shall see, further in the next chapter as well, why it is often necessary that unfortunately it is 
the poor who are the last to be benefited from economic growth, but this is not an argument 
against economic growth, because growth will eventually help the poor. Even if they are not able 
to take advantage of it as quickly as others, it does still diminish poverty in the long run. Further, 
there are indeed certain policies, that, if properly administered, could rectify this problem 
considerably, and especially control certain kinds of growth that actually can potentially hurt the 
poor in the short term so that that consequence does not occur, or at least compensate them for 
the damage that this paradoxical growth can inflict upon them. Therefore, growth should be 
supported as the primary means of alleviating poverty. 
First let‟s note the rare cases when growth actually can hurt the poor. Secondly, I shall 
argue that as growth in the long run does become distributed through the entire economy, it does 
inevitably help the poor. Because of this, we should tolerate the rare short term negative side 
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effects of growth that cannot be mitigated by individual policies designed to enhance 
development.  
There are two important theoretical cases where growth can harm the poor in a country. 
The first, a case presented by Bhagwati, is immiserizing growth, which, surprisingly, is a net loss 
for everybody in a country as a whole.
84
 The second is the phenomena of the poor being out 
competed due to increases in technology that the rich are far more likely to take advantage of, 
which, though it increases the size of the pie, it also redistributes that pie so that the poor receive 
in absolute terms less of it than they had before the growth. The first phenomena occurs when a 
country produces so much of a good that it reduces the price of that good to the point where it 
receives less for that good  in total revenue than before it increased its production. While 
theoretically this is a problem, it is mostly, if not entirely, confined to the textbook; further, the 
best solution to immiserizing growth is diversification,
85
 and as we shall see, in the following 
section 3.3, one of the benefits of globalisation and free trade is that it encourages diversification. 
 A second concern that globalisation‟s critics like to point to is growth in one sector of an 
economy that results in a loss for another poorer segment of the same economy. A good example 
is the following theoretical case.
86
  A new technology might be developed, or introduced as a 
result of globalisation, that allows certain farmers in a given economy, the ones who are already 
wealthy enough to invest in it, the ability to increase their yields considerably and therefore 
increase the size of the economy, but the poor farmers, who are not so fortunate to be able to 
afford to invest in this new technology, are obviously unable to produce more because of this 
                                                 
84
 Jagdish Bhagwhati, “Immiserizing Growth: A Geometrical Note,” The Review of Economic Studies. 25.3 (1958): 
201-5. 
85
 Jagdish Bhagwhati, In Defence of Globalisation. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 55. 
86
 This case is based on the fears that many had to the green revolution in India, which fortunately turned out to be 
unjustified as the green revolution had a profoundly positive effect on everybody in India including the poor. Ibid, 
55-6.  
 The Ethics of Globalisation, Free Trade and Fair Trade  90 
technology‟s introduction. Industrialised agriculture is a potential perfect example. So as the 
yields of the wealthy farmers increase, necessarily the price of the crops that all of the farmers 
are producing drops per crop, and thus the rich farmers grow richer and the poor farmers grow 
poorer. John Ralston Saul makes this point, among others, in the following paragraph. 
In well-organized markets there are strong rules against dumping. There is nothing new 
about this. It has been true for thousands of years. You can‟t have competition if some 
people can dump underpriced goods into markets in order to destroy the local structures 
and replace them with their own. Traditionally we think of dumping as the underpriced 
offloading of surplus goods. But in a consumer economy almost all goods can be seen as 
surplus. You could say that Globalization is a system of normalized dumping. The 
argument in favour is that only through dumping can the client buy the cheapest goods. 
This argument ignores the necessity of a stable market, which permits competition, 
which is in turn destroyed by such pricing. The most institutionalized and destructive 
form of modern dumping is industrialised agriculture. Why? Because it undermines the 
capacity of farmers in both the producing and the consuming societies to make enough 
profit to stay farming.
87
 
 
Three things must be noted in response to Saul‟s argument. First of all, the claim that 
industrialised farming is unsustainable in both consuming and producing economies is 
preposterous. Food is the most important good in every society, and the demand for it will keep 
farmers in business ahead of every other industry. While some inefficient farmers may be put out 
of business by larger scale industrialised farms, this only occurs because these larger farms are 
more than replacing the output of the smaller farms. Secondly, it is absurd to block technology or 
some other force that increases productivity from being introduced into economies, developing 
or otherwise, on the grounds that it will hurt a segment of that population in the short term, when 
in the long run it is beneficial to all members of that economy, including the poor.  
Such a position would create a catch 22 that can always be used to maintain the status 
quo. The poor will be benefited only to the extent that the short term harm to them will be 
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alleviated, and in absolute terms they will not be aided at all by such a policy. And of course, we 
will continue to be able to use the same argument to forbid introducing the new technology for 
ever. Thirdly, the claim that “Globalization is a system of normalized dumping” is equally 
preposterous. Globalisation may have the effect of destroying the way of life of many people 
who were employed providing certain services, just as inefficient farmers have their livelihoods 
diminished by industrialised agriculture, but this is only because they are unable to compete with 
the more efficient larger scale producers of those goods. Those producers are not dumping those 
goods when they provide them for less than local workers are able to produce them for, they are 
simply outcompeting them. And the workers who are in the short term harmed by the new supply 
of these goods will in the longer term adjust to begin to provide new goods and services, which 
are now only possible because the goods that they used to be providing are available for cheaper.  
There is an inherent and unpalatable chicken and egg problem that is at the heart of this 
debate, especially as it pertains to agriculture. Development requires a move away from 
subsistence farming and into one where a large portion of the population is employed in other 
sectors and all the food is produced by a very small percentage of the population. However, as 
food production moves in that direction, the poor, who are so often farmers, have the small 
amount of food that they were producing themselves and selling on the open market decrease in 
value. Once they move to other sectors in the economy, they will be able to buy the more 
efficiently produced food from the industrialised farms with the goods, suppose a light 
manufacturing industry is the industry which rises, that they then will be producing, and they 
will be better off, but in the short term they could easily be harmed by the introduction of 
industrialised agriculture. However, if industrialised agriculture is the egg and a new 
manufacturing industry for the poor farmers is the chicken, then clearly the egg must come first. 
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The poor farmers obviously cannot move into the new manufacturing industry before the more 
efficient and large scale and industrialised farms are producing the food for them to eat, and so if 
we are going to have the growth that the undeveloped and developing world needs, we will have 
to allow industrialised farming to take hold. 
Thus, while there are policies that can be put into place to mitigate as much as possible, if 
not eliminate completely, the harm that is done in the short term to the poor, it is essential that 
industrialised agriculture flourishes in developing and undeveloped countries, one way or 
another. So long as large segments of a country‟s population is subsistence farming, substantial 
economic development cannot occur, and that in itself is far more harmful in the long term than 
any short term growing pains that growth causes. Therefore, the theoretical possibility that 
growth may harm the poor in the short term cannot be used to make an argument against 
globalisation; rather, only an argument with a weaker conclusion is possible: some sort of 
mitigating policy, if possible, should be introduced to benefit the poor who are harmed by the 
growth of the economy, especially since it is largely the poor‟s welfare that we are concerned 
with increasing.
88
 
Aside from the two kinds of problems that growth can have mentioned above, growth is 
either good for the poor, or, if it does not affect them , such as if they are in a rural part of a 
country while the growth is occurring in the city, neutral towards them. However, growth usually 
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occurs in spurts and benefits at first certain small sections of an economy more so than other 
larger parts. The people fortunate enough to take advantage of new technology or practices do 
very well initially, and then as the practice or technology that makes them so successful slowly 
becomes more widespread, the wealth that is created by it increases further and becomes more 
evenly distributed throughout the population. Thus, growth needs to be supported, but we have to 
always remain patient and allow it to spread, as often it is the poor who have to wait the longest 
to be benefited,
89
 but benefited they will be, and the sooner the growth occurs, the sooner that 
will happen. 
3.3 Economies of Scale, Industrialisation, and Free Market Economies 
I have defined globalisation as having two halves: industrialised free market economies 
and free trade. In this section, we will look at how the first half of that conjunction benefits the 
poor and aids development. 
In the previous chapter we discussed how channelling aid through fair trade companies is 
inefficient because of economies of scale. I.e., fair trade companies are small and therefore, due 
to a lack of economies of scale, have higher costs. This results in a portion of the aid component 
of a fair trade transaction being wasted. This is a problem that my alternative approach 
sidestepped, which I argued was a reason in its favour.  
However, we didn‟t  reflect on why large companies (Nestlé was the example that we 
used to stand for them as a class) became so big in the first place. A free market forces 
companies to compete to produce the services and the products that they provide and make to 
their customers as cheaply as possible. The best way for companies to do this is to be as 
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productive as possible obviously, and this is achieved by adopting the practices and employing 
the technologies that results in the lowest costs. Companies that are not able to compete by either 
providing cheaper or better goods than their competition quickly go out of business, and the 
companies that survive quickly capture the market share that the companies that fail leave 
behind. The result is the same amount of goods are produced but with a smaller share of the total 
economy producing those goods. The portion of the economy that was made up of the companies 
that were not able to compete effectively are forced to move into new sectors and find another 
good or service to produce or provide instead. As this good or service enters the economy, the 
effect is growth and more wealth in total.
90
  
Economies of scale are an example of this force at work. As we noted in the previous 
chapter,  larger companies have better access to capital, which reduces their costs when they 
borrow money. They are able to get better rates when shipping their goods and buying their 
supplies because it is cheaper to transport in bulk. They also have lower management costs as a 
share of their goods‟ prices. The division of labour is a second example of this sort of force at 
work. As people specialise in certain trades and tasks they become more productive and provided 
that they are able to trade with each other, they have an incentive to begin specialising as they 
are able to trade the surplus goods and services for the ones that they necessarily had to abandon 
making and providing for themselves.  
Further, there are other efficiencies that also provide a reason to endorse free market 
economics as a integral part of development. The market is extremely effective at naturally 
regulating the production of an economy to fit the demands of that economy‟s population, and 
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the result is close to the optimum production and consumption given the resources of a given 
economy.
91
 There is certainly a question as to how unfettered markets should ideally be. For 
example, while it is generally accepted that markets are a crucial component of an efficient 
economy, many, if not most, economists accept that there is a need for moderate regulation to 
correct for a host of practical problems that can occur in the real world, such as monopolies 
forming. Further, many economists argue that subsidies and taxes to encourage and discourage 
respectively positive and negative externalities are in certain cases efficacious as well.
92
 
However the crucial point is that markets are the foundation of developed economies because of 
overall the efficiencies that they bring (These benefits are what are often linked to the ubiquitous 
metaphor of Adam Smith‟s invisible hand), and they are therefore an important part of 
globalisation and should be supported for that reason. 
However, there are further potential benefits of market or exchange economies that go 
beyond the efficiencies described above. This is the potential for the free market itself to be „an 
engine of growth‟ within a developing economy. In “From Subsidence to Exchange,”93 Bauer 
presents this position. Citing the historians Hoh-cheung and Lorna Mui,
94
 Jacob Price,
95
 and 
Richard Gassby,
96
 Bauer argues that much of the wealth of Britain and the United States of 
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America was directly created by traders engaging in free markets. The breakthrough of free 
markets as described by Adam Smith not only created an efficient way for goods to be 
distributed throughout the population, but it propelled further growth by creating “human 
capital” and “commercial institutions and practices” that proved to be the vehicle necessary for 
such growth. Banking institutions and stock markets, for example, secured the financing for this 
growth using the capital of the merchants who were already trading the goods that they 
recognised had the potential for expansion.
97
 
The hope is that internal trade itself will help to jumpstart undeveloped economies by 
creating a culture based more on trading and specialisation rather than subsistence, and this 
process will be self-perpetuating. As traders begin to provide desirable goods, that were 
previously unavailable, there will be considerable demand for them. In order for those goods to 
be purchased however, the would be consumers of these new goods will need to begin producing 
their own goods and services to exchange for them. Because these new goods are especially 
desirable, there is a further incentive to begin providing the services used to purchase those 
goods than before they arrived. Further, the more the economy develops to purchase these goods 
the larger the rewards become and the more pervasive the market activity becomes in the culture, 
which only fuels the growth further. Of course, this process is also considerably helped by 
external trading as well. By bringing in goods from developed economies, ones which the 
undeveloped economies could never provide themselves, this only creates even more of an 
incentive for the culture of trading to begin. Thus, this is even further argument for external 
trading, which is promoted by free trade, the other half of globalisation. 
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Further, financial institutions and practices provide opportunity and a means to diversify 
economies. Stock markets allow companies quickly to raise capital to take advantage of 
opportunities that they wouldn‟t otherwise be able to. Futures markets allow, for example, 
speculators to take on the risk of bumper crops and provide an avenue for farmers to sell their 
crops before they are even grown. Further, because of the liquidity created by such markets, 
farmers will be encouraged to diversify and start growing crops that they otherwise wouldn‟t. 
This solves the problem of immiserising growth described in section 3.2 and the problem of 
bumper crops discussed in section 2.5. 
The second crucial component of this half of globalisation, as I have defined it, is 
industrialisation. Clearly, there is a sense in which industrialisation is simply a specific case of 
the above forces, just like the division of labour or economies of scale. However, since it has had 
such a massive effect on the wealth generated by our economies, it is worth separating it and 
including it as a distinct part of globalisation in its own right, especially because in practical 
terms industrialisation can be used, for the most part, to distinguish what we consider the 
developed world, the developing world, and the undeveloped world.  We have already noted the 
massive shift of the work force away from agriculture and into other sectors that occurred in the 
developed world thanks to the industrial revolution: in Great Britain, for example, the 
agricultural workforce halved in the ninety years between 1780 and 1870.
98
 
Further, every other manufacturing industry, which necessarily represented a 
considerably smaller part of the total economy, saw similar gains of productivity because of 
industrialisation, and this growth is responsible for the considerable wealth that the developed 
world now enjoys. As Marks writes, “The lifestyle in the world we inhabit is made possible by 
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the immense increase in material production spawned by the Industrial Revolution.”99 Thus, the 
undeveloped world must embrace the culture that is the keystone of this development. They must 
adopt exchange or free market economies and they must utilise a division of labour and 
industrialisation. We shall consider objections to this position as nothing more than unashamed 
cultural imperialism in Chapter 4.1. 
Clearly, there is the appearance of an undesirable component of industrialisation: workers 
have very little bargaining power when they first move to urban environments (these are often 
nothing more than slums) and they work therefore for meagre wages. However, assuming that 
they are rational, we have to conclude that they are better off than they would be otherwise, so 
banning the sweatshops where they begin to work is not an effective solution. Instead, we should 
focus on increasing the bargaining power of the workers even further, and this ironically requires 
more not less sweatshops. Thus, sweatshops are in the short term a force for good (all be it a 
fairly minor one), and in the long term they will become equivalent to the factories of the 
developed world with better wages and higher safety standards, and are therefore a part of a long 
term project that is a force for considerable good. We shall return to this point and elaborate on it 
in section 4.4. 
3.4 Free Trade 
We have already noted that trades inherently increase total utility provided that we are 
prepared to accept that the agents involved are rational. In many ways this in itself is reason 
enough to support policies that make it easier for people to trade with each other both internally 
within a country and externally across borders. However, there is a further principle of trade that 
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applies even more between developed and undeveloped countries and illustrates further the 
benefits of free trade. Comparative advantage states that one should always specialise in what 
one does best, regardless if others do it better. We saw this principle at work in section 1.4 with 
the surgeon and the graduate student example. The surgeon makes £200/hour, while she is 
working at her surgery. The graduate student makes only £12/hour, while he is working as a TA. 
Even though the surgeon can mow her own lawn at a faster rate than the graduate student can 
mow it for her (suppose she could make £20/hour mowing lawns, and the graduate student 
cannot, because he is especially nonathletic), it is better for everybody if the student mows the 
surgeon‟s lawn. The surgeon could pay him, for example, £15/hour and he would make more 
money doing that than being a TA, while the surgeon can continue to work as a surgeon because 
she gets £200/hour doing that. Thus even though the surgeon is better at mowing lawns than the 
graduate student, if both parties specialise in what they do best, they both come out ahead and 
the result is growth. 
To put the case in terms of countries rather than individuals we can consider the 
following example: the principle of comparative advantage states that often a country is better 
off trading a good that it can produce to a second country, even if that second country can 
already make that good for less than the first country. Suppose there are two countries 
(Luckyland and Inopportunia ) and only two commodities (doughnuts and dentures). Luckyland, 
due to some reason or another, (better technology or access to more resources) can make both of 
these commodities more effectively than Inopportunia. Let‟s also assume that both countries 
value both commodities in such a way that if ever they had more of one than the other, they 
would trade, if they could, the more abundant for the rarer. 
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Let‟s suppose that Luckyland can make either 40 tonnes of doughnuts or 40 tonnes of 
dentures, or it can make any combination of the two adding up to 40, and let‟s assume that 
Inopportunia cannot make nearly as much of either. Also, it can make more doughnuts than 
dentures. Let‟s say that Inopportunia can make either 24 tonnes of doughnuts or 12 tonnes of 
dentures, or some combination of the two, so long as the same ratio is maintained, such as 16 
tonnes of doughnuts and 4 tonnes of dentures or 12 tonnes of doughnuts and 6 tonnes of 
dentures. Now assuming that they are not trading, Luckyland would make 20 tonnes of each (for 
a total 40 tonnes of product), which would be clearly utility maximising. Inopportunia, on the 
other hand, would make 8 tonnes of doughnuts and 8 tonnes of dentures (for a total of 16 tonnes 
of product). 
However, suppose that they are able to trade. Inopportunia would be best to make entirely 
doughnuts, and Luckyland would be best to switch it‟s production to make more dentures and 
less doughnuts, and both countries would be advantaged by trading doughnuts from Inopportunia 
for dentures from Luckyland. Inopportunia would make 24 tonnes of doughnuts and could trade 
14 tonnes of them to Luckyland for 10 tonnes of dentures; they would be left with 10 tonnes of 
doughnuts and 10 tonnes of dentures, and they would have 4 more tonnes of product than they 
had before. Luckyland, which would now be making 32 tonnes of dentures and 8 tonnes of 
doughnuts, would be left with 22 of both, and they too would have four more tonnes of product.  
There would be 8 tonnes of additional goods produced, and, while in this case, these surplus 
goods are being evenly distributed, actually it is the bargaining power of the two countries which 
determines that distribution.  
Plausibly, the richer country will actually have the upper hand in negotiating the terms of 
the trade, and we might expect them to receive a larger amount of the surplus, but in absolute 
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terms, provided that the poorer country is behaving rationally, we should expect both countries to 
be benefited by the trade, or they wouldn‟t do it. However, as we have seen in section 3.1, 
focusing on inequality is a separate debate, complicated by the two contrasting approaches of 
prioritarians and egalitarians, and as I have argued, given the situation, we should be prioritarian 
in practice, as by far the most important thing is solving poverty first when people are actually 
dying of starvation. Therefore, it is not a viable objection to point out that the terms of trade, 
while theoretically being mutually beneficial, provide greater benefit to the already richer party 
rather than the poorer. Once the poor in the undeveloped and developed world are lifted out of 
poverty to the extent that they are no longer in danger of starvation, then the debate between 
prioritarians and egalitarians becomes of interest, but until then priority should be our primary 
concern. 
Undeveloped countries find themselves in this very position with developed countries. 
Often they cannot produce any good as effectively as the developed nations already can 
themselves, but provided that they produce some good better than others, or the developed 
country produces some goods better than others, they can still trade and create mutual growth. It 
is this theory that underlies much of the theoretical reason to support free trade, as Samuelson 
puts it in his famous economics textbook, “this simple principle provides the unshakable basis 
for international trade.”100 However, there is mounting empirical evidence to support the merits 
of free trade as well as the theory of comparative advantage. 
The World Bank released a report in 2002 titled Globalization, Growth and Poverty: 
Building an Inclusive World Economy. In this report, it divided developing countries into two 
groups: 24 of them which had doubled their ratio of trade to income over the previous two 
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decades, and the rest, which were actually trading less than they were 20 years before. The first 
group it commonly refers to as the „new globalizers‟ or the „more globalized‟ developing 
countries while the second group it refers to as the „less globalized.‟ The difference in 
performance of those two groups of countries‟ economies is striking. The new globalisers had a 
growth rate of only 1% during the 1960s. In the 1970s it was 3%, in the 1980s it was 4%, and in 
the 1990s it was 5%. Further, in the 1990s these countries were growing considerably faster than 
the already developed countries, which were growing at just over 2% on average during that 
time. The less globalised developing countries on the other hand have performed far worse. In 
the 1990s, their economies were shrinking not just compared to the rest of the world, but in 
absolute terms.
101
 Clearly, liberal trade policy and free markets are highly correlated to growth. 
Further, while there have been cases where closed and non-liberalised economies have grown 
surprisingly rapidly, this has never been sustained for over two decades.
102
 The evidence is 
clearly in favour of free markets and trade, which are amazingly correlated with growth in both 
developed and non developed economies. 
Critics will no doubt quibble that the „new globalizers‟ have not adapted every liberal 
trading and internal economic policy possible, so there is still much debate to be had on which of 
these policies are the crucial ones.
103
 We shall deal with this objection in section 4.2 Also they 
will no doubt argue that the „new globalizers‟ contain both India and China, and while both of 
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those countries have had large amounts of their population lifted out of poverty,
104
 there are still 
large portions of their population that have remained poor, especially in rural areas, that in terms 
of population size easily are equivalent in size to some of the less globalised countries that did 
not grow, so globalisation has not worked in their cases.
105
 
However, we have already addressed this criticism to an extent, and in section 4.4  we 
shall see further why globalisation cannot help everybody at the same speed, and why certain 
segments, especially the extreme poor, in developing countries may need to wait longer to see 
the gains of globalisation as compared to the other comparatively more advantaged segments 
already within that population. 
Conclusion 
Thus, globalisation should be supported. For the ordinary person this is a difficult project, 
but there are at least small steps that we can take. We can resist calls to boycott goods made in 
sweatshops and to buy goods and services that eschew practices that employ sweatshop labour, 
because although sweatshops are not the goal of development, they are part of the process of 
development. Perhaps most importantly we can vote for and encourage our governments not to 
engage in protectionist policy that hampers trade with developing and undeveloped countries. 
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Chapter 4 
Introduction 
In this final chapter we look at objections that may be raised against my position. 
Specifically, we will consider objections that turn largely on empirical claims that opponents of 
globalisation may disagree with me over. Unfortunately due to space constraints, it will probably 
not be possible to answer every objection to the satisfaction of those who raise them. However, I 
hope to provide a response that at least demonstrates that there is a viable position that those in 
favour of globalisation may at least employ, and perhaps further, to persuade a reader who is less 
committed to either position that globalisation‟s proponents have the more solid ground to stand 
upon. In section 4.1 we shall respond to critics who assert that globalisation is cultural 
imperialism and should therefore be objected to on that ground. In section 4.2, I respond to the 
objection that we should moderate globalisation with protectionist policies, because we need to 
take into account individual countries‟ and regions‟ particular circumstances. In section 4.3, I 
respond to an alternative version of fair trade, that we should boycott and impose protectionist 
policies on free trade goods, and finally, in section 4.4, I consider the objection that globalisation 
will lead to perpetual inequality, where developed nations will forever trap the undeveloped and 
developing world into a state of servitude, so that they remain constantly poor and therefore 
forced to provide cheap goods for the developed world‟s benefit. 
4.1 Paternalism, Cultural Imperialism vs Relativism, and Rationality 
A frequent objection to globalisation is one that complains that its proponents do not 
appreciate the value of the lives of many in the undeveloped world, and they argue that 
globalisation is cultural imperialism. I mentioned this objection in section 1.3, the introduction to 
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chapter three, and in section 3.3. Critics who make this objection against globalisation agree that 
poverty is a massive problem, but they take as an assumption that globalisation is a force for evil, 
because they see globalisation as replacing an old and better way of life with a new life of 
poverty. This assumption is largely prevalent because of the confusion between relative and 
absolute poverty, which creates the false impression that globalisation is making poverty worse, 
because it often appears to be increasing inequality, and as we  have seen, once the confusion is 
resolved, this assumption is false. However, because of that false assumption, opponents of 
globalisation are able to rely on the following often implicit reasoning. 
1)Globalisation is changing the way that people live in undeveloped countries so that they 
are becoming westernised; i.e., they are adopting free market economies, industrialising, 
and moving to urban environments. 
2)Poverty is getting worse because of this process; i.e., the people‟s lives are worse. (false 
assumption) 
3)However, in many economic terms, (GDP per Capita for example) these countries are 
improving. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4)Therefore, the way of life in which these people used to live must not have been captured 
properly by these economic analyses, and it was wrong for the people living in those 
countries to lose their culture.  
Saul in The Collapse of Globalism writes the following: 
Meanwhile, a growing number of highly respected figures speaking outside of the Western 
democracies are turning their backs on theoretically scientific interpretations of global 
success such as trade statistics and cumulative GDPs. What they see are real people whose 
actual standard of living apparently must drop in order for them to appear to rise in 
Western-style statistics[....]These people may have been living a life beyond such measures  
–perhaps rural lives. They are therefore technically existing on zero income. Then they 
move to a desperate urban slum where dirty water, sewage and alienation are the norm. But 
in such a place, even a dollar‟s worth of income can be measured. And so Western 
measurement systems say they have taken a step forward and upward.
106
 
 
                                                 
106
 Saul, The Collapse of  Globalism: And the Reinvention of the World, 23. 
 The Ethics of Globalisation, Free Trade and Fair Trade  106 
The position takes the airs of superior tolerance, which is perhaps cultural relativism‟s 
only virtue, or indeed yet another of its many vices. It purports to ask, who are we to tell others 
in faraway lands how they should live? And then it answers this rhetorical question with supreme 
humility: we are indeed in no position either to prescribe or proscribe how others should live 
and to presume that our values are universal. However, buried beneath this veil of humility is 
extreme paternalism. The view itself assumes that these people, who used to live such idyllic “–
perhaps rural lives” – need us to remind them of this fact. Alas, according to these critics, 
unfortunately we are too busy measuring these peoples‟ rising GDPs to find the time to point out 
to them that they are so much less happy than they used to be. 
This dispute can be put to rest easily. If we assume that people are for the most part 
rational (as I do), then we can see how preposterous the claim that, for example, urbanisation is 
not a force for good, but indeed the opposite, is. Rational people don‟t move to the city and 
immediately forget the lives that they left behind, so they also don‟t stay in the city if the lives 
that they left behind were clearly better than their new ones. From afar it may be surprising that 
people choose to abandon their rural subsidence farming lives to move to the slums of nearby 
cities just to have the privilege of working in sweat shops for pennies an hour, but that is only 
because we compare the lives that they are moving to, to our own lives and not to the rural lives 
that they were previously living. Clearly, subsistence is not all that it is cracked up to be, if the 
life in slums is superior to it, and if we accept that, then that is even more reason to support the 
industrialisation of agriculture. 
Thus, I reject the objection that globalisation is unconscionable cultural imperialism. It is 
certainly true that there is a considerable cultural shift throughout the world, and countries are 
certainly becoming more westernised, adopting free market systems and industrialisation, but 
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this shouldn‟t be lamented in itself, indeed it should be celebrated. Cultural imperialism is evil 
when the change in culture that results from it is being intentionally imposed by the powerful 
upon the weak and against their will. However, this is not the case with globalisation, or it 
certainly doesn‟t need to be the case. While famously the IMF and  The World Bank do put 
stringent conditions on their aid and loans, the vast majority of globalisation occurs naturally as 
market forces favour efficient practices such as mass production, industrialisation and the 
division of labour. It is this force that primarily is responsible for the westernisation of the 
developing and undeveloped world and it is further evidence that globalisation should be 
favoured, because the fact that people are adopting these practices inherent to globalisation, is 
evidence of its virtue, not its sinister intent to destroy their cultures. 
4.2 Other Undue Appeals to Moderation 
In Section 3.4, we noted that there were several objections that might be raised against 
the position of trade liberalisation. One of those objections was that perhaps we should consider 
breaking down the dichotomy between free trade and market economies on one side and 
protectionism and regulation on the other, because as every country and region is different, a 
host of different policies from both positions may be the best solution. Further, this objection 
could easily be raised for much of what was said in other parts of my thesis, especially 3.3 and 
3.2 as well. Thus, let‟s consider the debate over the extent that we should advocate liberal policy. 
It is true that there is a continuum of possible economic and public policy that we may choose 
from. If we try to shunt the debate, awkwardly, into the standard right wing vs left wing 
dichotomy, we might classify neo liberal policy as to the right and various less globalised 
alternatives to the left. 
 The Ethics of Globalisation, Free Trade and Fair Trade  108 
The extreme of right wing policy has as of yet existed only in the minds of its proponents, 
such as Ayn Rand or Robert Nozick perhaps, as a paradise of freedom and self-sufficiency. 
Clearly, we should not require developing countries to go to such far fringes of possible policy, 
because no countries in the developed world have ever implemented it themselves, so, while its 
proponents may insist that it would be a further step forwards, one that we would benefit from 
too according to them, it is obviously not necessary. This argument is sound, but it can easily be 
taken too far. 
 Critics of globalisation are quick to argue that we cannot assume that every liberal trade 
policy has been efficacious, just because on the whole liberalisation of markets has been
107
 (if 
they are even prepared to grant that), so we should remain open; we should be prepared to adapt 
a mixture of policy. This hybrid policy could easily depend on a host of factors, so it would vary 
case by case. Thus, we should not be afraid of espousing liberal trade policy, yet also be prepared 
to recommend non liberal, perhaps protectionist, policy when individual circumstances require it.  
There are reasonable debates about how far to embrace free trade, eschew protectionism 
and institute regulations to fend off monopolies and other warts of the market. But there is also 
an obvious trend that it is essential to identify correctly. Command economies have failed. 
Market economies and industrialisation have proven to be far superior, and on the continuum 
between the two extremes we are arguing about where to place our policy in a relatively small 
range, clearly on the side of the free market. There is no disputing that as a trend the countries 
that have accomplished, what is the direct goal of free trade policy, an increase in trade, have 
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done considerably better than those that have not over the last 40 years, and that through history 
this trend has been repeated.
108
 
4.3 Boycotting, Protectionism, and Human Rights 
We now move to price floors and another form of anti-globalisation which is often 
associated with fair trade. In the introduction of chapter 2, we noted that there is a second 
position often termed, or at least associated with, fair trade. In this approach, the focus is put on 
raising the working conditions of workers in developing economies by mandating it through 
regulation. There are primarily two motivations for this: one is advocated by those who are 
mostly worried about workers in developed countries having to compete with people living in 
much poorer parts of the world. This position is often associated with the catch phrase „race to 
the bottom.‟  Secondly, there are, of course, proponents of boycotting goods from developing 
economies who have entirely selfless motivations, and these people argue that we should boycott 
companies that rely on goods made in sweatshops and that we should impose sanctions on the 
countries that allow such labour practices to be carried out within their borders, because they 
argue that it will benefit the workers of those countries. 
While it is far too cynical to assume that the advocates of this anti-globalisation position 
are entirely in it for their own sake and have little to no regard for the workers who they see as 
the threat, it is clear that for many of them protectionism is a major goal of the policy that they 
espouse, because of the benefit it will have for workers in the developed world. For example, the 
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrialized Organizations (communally 
abbreviated as the ALF-CIO) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (which 
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is commonly abbreviated ICFTU) support a social clause that would allow sanctions to be 
brought on countries, through the WTO, that fail to require companies in them to live up to 
certain working condition standards, especially child labour laws.
109
 Given their purpose is 
primarily to benefit their members‟ workers, there is at best a conflict of interest, and at worst a 
blatant attempt to circumvent the WTO‟s mandate to promote international trade and to impose 
protectionist policies at the expense of consumers in the developed world and the workers in the 
developing world who are supposedly the beneficiaries of the policy. In other cases this view 
advocating protectionism is proposed entirely, and unashamedly, because it will benefit the 
developed world, surprisingly from both the right and the left wing. For example Pat Buchanan 
in “Time for Economic Nationalism,”110 and the American Senators Dorgan and Brown who 
wrote the following in a coauthored article published in the Washington Post called “How Free 
Trade Hurts:”   
We must insist that all trade agreements have labor, environmental and other protections so 
that American workers can compete on a level playing field. Trade agreements must also 
be reciprocal. The American market is the most desirable in the world. Every country 
wants access to it. That gives us a great deal of leverage, if only we'd use it.
111
  
  
However, there are certainly advocates for both the social clause and other similar 
measures to be taken who do not have such conflicts of interest or selfish motivations, so it is 
this position that we shall be considering. We will thus look at the argument as one that is 
advocating these measures purely to help alleviate poverty in the developing world. And, it is in 
terms of how effectively it achieves this objective that we shall evaluate it.  Essentially this 
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approach takes two forms in practice, first boycotting certain stores, (such as Walmart or the 
Gap) which is a position often associated with the anti-globalisation author Naomi Klein in, for 
example, No Logo
112
 and Fences and Windows.
113
 And secondly, supporting protectionist policy 
that penalises countries that allow such labour conditions to exist within their borders, like the 
proposed social clause for the WTO, for example, argued for by many anti-globalisation and 
anti-sweatshops advocacy groups, such as the National Labor Committee.
114
 
However, there is a major theoretical problem that such policies have, and because of this 
they often hurt, ironically, the people that they are supposed to help. We shall look at both what 
occurs when a price floor is established, and why in many ways the movement to enforce 
worker‟s rights in the developing world is equivalent to a price floor. 
A common case cited in economic text books is what theoretically occurs when minimum 
wage laws are established. This is very similar to the effect of mandating better working 
conditions in sweat shops in developing countries. Effectively, in by far the majority of cases, 
better working conditions are valuable to employees and costly to employers. I draw a distinction 
between the workers who are actually employed (henceforth „employees‟) and the total group of 
people who potentially could be employed (who I shall call simply „workers‟) . Thus, it is to the 
benefit of the „employees‟ to have higher wages mandated by regulation, though as we shall see 
shortly, it will often not be of benefit to the group of workers as a whole, some of whom will be 
unable to work, because of the policy. Thus, insisting that goods are made while paying wages 
high enough to guarantee a certain quality of living and/or working conditions for the workers 
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who are making them, creates a minimum cost that is higher than it otherwise would be. Thus, 
this has a similar effect to setting a price floor on a good or instituting a minimum wage. 
 It is important to note that I am not advocating that we necessarily abandon all policies 
that have this effect (though as we shall see, it is important to be very careful when implementing 
these policies, as they often do more harm than good to the people they are designed to help), 
because there will be some cases where the cost will be minimal and the benefits large, such that 
if the workers were aware of them, they would insist upon them themselves. However, in these 
cases, what is effectively happening is a third party, such as developed countries‟ consumers or 
regulators (possibly responding to special interests within their countries, such as trade unions 
whose members are being threatened by the lower cost goods being produced), is forcing this 
(supposed) benefit onto these workers, and it is assuming that the workers are ignorant to what is 
actually best for themselves (or worse –as is often the case when regulators are responding to 
special interests within their own country– unconcerned entirely with the costs that workers in 
the developing world will incur because of these policies). In certain cases it is true that, because 
of the ignorance of workers, there is a policy that would benefit them greatly that they are not 
demanding; e.g., there may be an especially toxic dye that is being used in the goods that they 
are manufacturing, and this dye may be only slightly cheaper than alternatives. However, it is 
important to note that in these cases, we require assuming that the workers are not behaving 
rationally, when they allow the practice to continue, and as we have seen, we need to be 
especially careful when making such an assumption. It is reasonable to assume that usually this 
is not the case, and the workers are behaving rationally. 
 Further, in some cases, the policy designed to increase the working conditions of the 
workers can be clearly in neither the employees‟ nor the employer‟s interests. These might take 
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the form of limits on the hours that the employees are permitted to work in a day or a week. This 
can be seen by considering the following case: assume, first of all, that employees have not been 
given a minimum, or at least not an onerous minimum, amount of hours to work in a week or a 
day. Most people are the best judges of their own preferences as to what constitutes the optimum 
balance of work and free time, and if shorter hours were to the benefit of the employers, then 
they wouldn‟t allow their employees to take such long hours in the first place. Thus both the 
employees and the employers are probably being harmed by a policy that restricts the amount of 
work in which the employees are allowed to engage in, in such a case. 
However, it is safe to assume that in most cases when policies are implemented with the 
intention of raising the living standards of workers in the sweat shops of the developing and 
undeveloped world, these policies do at least accomplish that goal for the employees, if not for 
the workers as a whole. However, despite it being true that measures to increase the living 
conditions of employees in sweatshops does increase their welfares, it is still usually bad policy 
to adopt such a practice, because it hurts the workers on the whole, specifically the workers who 
are no longer able to get jobs because of the practice. To illustrate this point let‟s look at price 
floors and minimum wages. 
We have noted that employment is analogous to a trade. Workers are hired by companies 
only if their labour provides the company with more value than the cost of the wages those 
workers are paid, and similarly, workers will only work for a company provided that they are 
compensated by more than they would be in other available jobs. Thus, both the workers and the 
company are benefited by the arrangement, and if either are not, then they will terminate the 
arrangement. If a government policy mandates a wage floor, essentially if a government requires 
that all workers must be paid over a certain minimum amount, then certain jobs are removed 
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from the economy, unless the wage floor is set so low as to have no effect: i.e., if the forces of 
competition are already requiring manufacturers in the labour market to pay above those wages. 
We can look at this in terms of supply and demand. The higher wages are, the more 
workers will want to work, and this is represented as the supply of labour. Similarly, the higher 
wages are, the less companies will hire, and this is represented by the demand for labour. Thus, 
any job that is only profitable for companies below the price floor is destroyed, and any worker 
who would have provided that job at that rate of pay is forced clearly, as a worker would only 
have been prepared to fill that job if a better job was not available, into unemployment and is, 
therefore, harmed by the policy. Ironically, it is the most unskilled and disadvantaged workers 
who are the victims of such a policy, exactly the people that it is supposed to help.  
 
Boycotting goods because they come from sweatshops in the developing and (potentially) 
the undeveloped world has similar effects. First of all, it reduces the profits that those sweatshops 
make, and it reduces the demand for the products that they supply. This slows down the process 
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of globalisation, and, as we shall see in the next section, ironically the problem with the labour 
conditions in those sweat shops that such a policy hopes to rectify is that there are not enough of 
sweatshops to provide a competitive labour market –not that there are too many of them.  
Further, if the policy were to become effective, if it was actually possible to communicate 
to the owners of the sweatshops that the reason that we are not buying their goods is because of 
the working conditions in their sweatshops (which is a dubious supposition in itself), it would 
have exactly the effect of a minimum wage discussed above. Those sweatshops would be forced 
to pay wages above the equilibrium price, and this would create a considerable surplus of a 
labour, in the form of unemployment, which would be directly against the interest of the workers 
in those sweatshops. Thus, this version of free trade is actually far worse than the version that we 
discussed at further length in chapter 2. At least in that version proponents of fair trade were, 
probably, helping the workers in the developing and undeveloped world as a whole, although 
inefficiently. With this form of fair trade, the workers who the policies are supposed to help are 
directly harmed by such policy, and the world would be better off without it entirely. 
4.4 The means of production, profits and Inequality. 
A favourite criticism of globalisation is one that is similar to the Marxist worry over 
access to the means of production. However, now the focus is on „profits.‟  With this objection 
globalisation‟s critics can grant that while the working conditions of sweatshops are poor, those 
working conditions are at least better than the alternative (though of course they don‟t have to 
grant this, and often times they do not). However, they worry that as globalisation continues, all 
of the factories that are created  will be owned by foreign investors, or benefiting foreign owned 
companies, who will constantly be siphoning off the vast majority of the profits that those 
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factories create. If shoes cost a multinational company only pennies each, and they turn around 
and sell those to consumers in the developed world for £50, the developing world is seeing only 
a fraction of the purchase price. The worry becomes, will this not create a legacy of perpetual 
inequality? While technically not slavery, because the workers are not being forced against their 
will, they have such little bargaining power they effectively have no choice but to work in brutal 
conditions for tiny wages. The industrial revolution brought similar worries. The early days of 
the industrial revolution are well remembered. The works of Charles Dickens, for example, paint 
a grim picture of the contrasting lives of the working class compared to the owners of the 
factories where they worked. 
There is no doubt that during the beginning of the industrial revolution factory owners 
got rich while their employees‟ lives hardly improved. Given the discrepancy between the lives 
of the workers and the factory owners, it is easy to see how one could become confused about 
the nature of the problem. The obvious difference between the two groups was of course who it 
was that owned the factories, or the means of production, and of course it was the owners who 
pocketed the massive profits that those means were producing. At the time many were certainly 
worried that that situation would persist forever: the factory owners (the few elite) might become 
the new kings, owning everything, while the workers (the vast majority of the population) would 
live in near destitution, barely surviving with what little the factory owners paid them. 
It is important to note though that those worries have for the most part abated since the 
industrial revolution without any radical movement away from capitalism or market economies 
in Britain or the rest of the developed world, and there is a clear reason for this. The problem was 
not who owned the means of production, but how little of it there was. Let‟s take the textile 
industry for example, because it epitomises the situation especially well. The invention of the 
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steam engine along with other engineering advancements, such as the flying shuttle, meant that it 
quickly became possible for a very few unskilled workers to produce considerably more cloth 
than textile workers were previously able. The result was a huge amount of people were put out 
of work by this considerable advancement of the industrial revolution, because even though the 
factories couldn‟t employ them all, those factories were still making far more cloth than those 
workers were able to in the past, and they could no longer compete at all.
115
 Those workers and 
more from other industries swarmed to get jobs in textile and other factories, but as there were 
very few people who possessed the skills and the capital to construct the factories, and because 
the labour required to work the machines was unskilled, or required entirely new skills, there was 
bitter competition for those jobs. 
This competition massively reduced the bargaining power of the workers and meant that 
the considerable surpluses that were being created by those factories were being claimed almost 
entirely by the owners. But the more money those factories made, the more incentive there was 
for the owners to increase production and build more factories, and the more incentive there was 
for other entrepreneurs to begin to build competing factories. Slowly more and more factories 
came online and slowly the massive surplus of labour was exhausted. The result of that was the 
reduced bargaining power of the owners and it is this that allowed the workers to begin to claim 
a larger percentage of the surplus that those factories were creating, especially by the creation of 
unions which the factory owners eventually had to allow, because they knew that if they didn‟t, 
those workers would soon be operating the spinning mules of their competitors. 
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This same story is playing out in the developing world today. Just as the luddites and 
other machine breakers destroyed the looms of an emerging industrial textile industry,
116
 in a 
selfish yet ironically misguided attempt to protect their way of life at the expensive of everybody 
else, critics of globalisation are attempting to halt the tide of development because of the same 
fears. Of course, as is now clear, slowing the process of industrialisation was not to anybody‟s 
long term advantage and not to the economy‟s, as a whole, short term advantage either. The vast 
middle class that exists today, thanks to industrialisation, is populated by people who would have 
filled out the rank and file of the poor in the past. Also, while the luddites, made up of textile 
workers who were losing their livelihood, were temporarily made worse off by industrialisation, 
we have to remember that they were incredibly poor by modern standards anyways and, had 
industrialisation not happened, they still would be –along with everybody else.  
We must also remember that the reason the factory owners were making such profits 
from their new factories was because there was such a demand for the cloth that they were 
making. Though there is no question that the textile workers, whose interests the luddites 
represented, were made worse off, the consumers of the new fabric were benefited considerably 
due to the massive amount of more cloth being produced. While we may look back at the 
working conditions of the factories, which were essentially the sweatshops of today, with 
distaste, that‟s because we are looking back at those conditions with modern sensibilities; we of 
course overestimate the utility of the lives that those unskilled workers were leaving behind, 
which presumably were even worse, or they wouldn‟t have been flocking to the cities to take up 
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positions in the new factories. Thus, at no point was the economy or the population as a whole 
worse off because of industrialisation. 
Finally, it is worth noting that on the whole there is little doubt that despite 
globalisation‟s potential, in the short term, to increase inequality for large sections of the world‟s 
population, world inequality on the whole has been falling, depending on which studies one 
accepts, since at least the 1980s.
117
 
Conclusion 
Writing on poverty is a daunting prospect, and so is trying to understand how to come to 
grips with it, not only for governments, aid agencies, and charities, but also for ordinary people 
as well. There are so many complicated and intertwined issues, like demandingness and which 
charities and policies to favour, that it is easy to become paralysed wondering what, if anything, 
we should do  –often to the extent that we do nothing at all– when there are simple and non-
demanding actions that we can take right now to help solve poverty. 
 The extent to which people want to sacrifice their own fortunes is a question that I have 
ignored almost completely in this thesis, but assuming that we do wish to do at least something 
to reduce poverty, then I hope that the approach that I have advocated can provide  assistance 
regardless of the extent that a normal person might want to endeavour to do so. Certainly, I hope 
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that I have provided reasons to avoid certain approaches, which don‟t benefit either the 
developing or undeveloped world or the would be donator.  
I have argued that we should take a consequentialist approach to thinking about the 
problem of poverty and one based on absolute welfare rather than relative inequality. I have 
argued that we should not support fair trade, instead using the same amount of money to support 
charities that will bring aid to the people who need it more efficiently. I have also argued that we 
should support globalisation and buy products that have been made in the developing world, 
even if the working conditions under which they are made are less than ideal, and I have argued 
that we shouldn‟t favour protectionist policy, either because it helps workers in the developing 
world or especially because it helps workers in the undeveloped and developing world, because 
it does neither. 
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